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1. Introduction. 
 
I. Two Dimensions of Empirical Intentionality  
 
This project is an exploration of some aspects of intentionality, and in particular of the linguistic-
cum-theoretical systems that have content because they are about the world. Let us begin by 
considering two pictures, roughly painted, of the structure of intentionality.  
 
The main figures in the first picture are pairs: words with objects, sentences with facts. Words—
think of singular terms, lest we weaken the picture until it is of no interest—may bear an intentional 
relation to objects. Sentences may bear an intentional relation to facts. The former relation is that of 
reference, the latter that of truth. Words and sentences are bits of language; objects and facts are bits of 
the world. We may think of this as a picture of intentionality as vertical: bits of language stand in 
intentional relations to bits of the world. We may also think of this as a picture of intentionality as 
representation: language is a system that serves to represent the world.  
 
There is another picture of intentionality that stands in opposition to the aforementioned. At 
meaning’s fundament, according to this other view, sentences bear intentional relations not to 
facts—not to bits of the world—but to other sentences. Appealing to this tradition’s favorite 
exemplar, we may say that ‘it’s raining’ has its meaning not in virtue of the conditions under which it 
is related to a fact of the world, but in virtue of its relation to other sentences: for example, ‘the 
streets will be wet’. This relation is that of material inference. Truth and reference, where they feature in 
such a picture, feature as derivative and deflated. The intentionality of a linguistic system consists 
not in the way it confronts the world but in its inferentially-articulated structure. We may think of 
this as a picture of intentionality as horizontal.  
 
I do not think that either of these pictures, even when elaborated, can stand alone as a satisfactory 
answer to the question of what it is to represent the world. Consider, for example, the picture of 
intentionality as vertical. Although I believe that there is an intentional relationship of reference in 
which some singular terms stand to some objects, and although I shall argue that this relationship is 
essential to empirical intentionality as such, in part because it is only by means of this relation that 
empirical predicates may have content, I do not believe that predicates themselves receive adequate 
treatment in accounts of intentionality as vertical. A monadic predicate, on such a picture, is 
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associated with a property; an n-place predicate with an n-place relation. Such predicates represent 
the world insofar as such properties and relations are worldly objects. This may be: but they cannot 
be objects just like the objects designated by singular terms. And this is not a merely metaphysical, 
hence extralinguistic, matter. If we wish to take seriously the thought that intentionality involves 
representing the world, it must be that bits of language represent bits of the world in a way that is 
proper to those bits. When we ask “what way is that?”, it is scarcely satisfactory to say, “predicates 
represent properties”. This does not distinguish the way in which predicates represent properties 
from the way in which singular terms represent objects. 
 
My concern here is related to that of Michael Dummett in his criticism of modest meaning theories 
[WITM]. Dummett argues that any adequate meaning theory—a full-blooded meaning theory, in his 
idiom— must characterize the practical ability that a speaker has when she has knowledge of a 
language. He thinks that any such characterization must, to be an adequate one, elucidate the 
content of the concepts associated with the words of the language. For example, such a theory cannot 
merely associate the word ‘sodium’ with the concept sodium. It must characterize the content of 
sodium itself.  
 
Of course, knowing one’s way around the concept sodium involves knowing about sodium. And so 
what a full-blooded meaning theory attributes to a speaker, with respect to any empirical predicate, is 
knowledge (in whatever form) of some bit of the world. The speaker’s linguistic know-how, with 
respect to empirical predicates, cannot be pulled apart from her empirical knowledge (whether 
explicit or implicit). I think that this is correct. Indeed, this is one aspect of intentionality upon 
which I shall insist throughout: that genuine empirical content requires, and is in part constituted by, 
factual presuppositions. The problem with the picture of intentionality as vertical is that it does not 
give us a way of making sense of how such factual presuppositions enter into distinctively linguistic 
activity: it does not tell us what we do with them, or in what form they are presented to us. (This 
criticism too echoes one of Dummett’s in the Introduction to SL.) 
 
The picture of intentionality as horizontal is, in these respects, superior. For it tells us that concepts, 
like the predicates with which they are associated, may be constituted by their role in inference. 
Suppose that there is a sense in which the content of a concept is constituted by some factual 
presuppositions. Then the answer to our question how such factual presuppositions appear in a 
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system of empirical intentionality is this: they show up as inferential principles. For example, my 
factual presupposition 
 that sodium, when thrown into water, induces a violent explosion 
is embodied in the principle according to which I may move from 
 a is a lump sodium 
to 
 a, when thrown into water, would induce a violent explosion. 
 
But the picture of intentionality as horizontal is, like its alternative, on its own inadequate. For we 
cannot, with it alone, make sense of an intentional system as one that is about the world. The 
problem is that not just any inferentially-articulated structure can have content. If a system is not in 
intentional contact with the world itself—if its users are not open to the world—it is shrouded in 
darkness. The way to be open to the world is to use one’s perceptual apparatus. What I intend here 
is a variation on Kant’s notion of sensible intuition. An intuition of an object is a conceptual-perceptual 
representing of that very object. One’s power to use one’s perceptual apparatus to be open to the 
world is, I shall suggest, the paradigm of vertical intentionality, and correlative with our semantic 
notions of singular reference and truth. I think that both of these are irreducibly vertical intentional 
relations that must be considered as such if we are to make sense of our representing the world 
itself. Moreover, I do not think that singular reference and truth are inessential additions, mere extra 
appendages of an inferential body, or non-intentional, matter-of-factual additions. If the moves 
allowed by such a body are to be moves in the space of reasons, the proprieties of inference that 
constitute the body must be systematically related to conceptual-perceptual representings with 
singular demonstrative content, in such a way that we may say that the empirical predicates of the 
language are, in a very real sense, extracted directly from the stuff of the world, in the course of our 
epistemic commerce with wordly objects. I am concerned in this project to imagine some of the 
aspects of such commerce. 
 
Some advocates of the picture of intentionality as horizontal have argued that this conception of 
openness to the world is confused. Such an argument was most famously presented in Wilfrid 
Sellars’s EPM. The folly Sellars there identifies, to caricature his discussion, is that of supposing that 
there can obtain an intentional relationship between conceptual entities—thoughts, sentences, and 
the like—and non-conceptual entities—whether conceptually unstructured sensuous experiences, 
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objects in the world, or whatever. Nothing, as Donald Davidson elsewhere put it, can justify 
something propositional (dit conceptual) except some other propositional thing.  
 
To avoid the Myth of the Given, it is necessary, according to some authors, to sacrifice vertical 
intentionality entirely, in favor of a picture of intentionality as horizontal, in combination with a 
purely causal relationship between language and world. Here is Jay Rosenberg, denying that 
correspondence—a kind of vertical intentionality—could be the criterion of truth: 
Yet in saying that correspondence, qua [TP: non-intentional] protocorrelation, forms the 
substance of matter-of-factual truth, we must not make the mistake of interpreting this claim 
as the caim that correspondence is the criterion of truth. To do so is to fall once again into the error 
of supposing a concept-free yet cognitive epistemological commerce with the world (“The Myth of the Given”). 
[LR p. 121, my emphasis] 
 
Rosenberg develops a picture of horizontal intentionality that he intends to satisfy our demands for 
a relationship between word and object, sentence and fact. The linguistic system develops under the 
causal influence of the world, so it bears an isomorphic resemblance to it, at least eventually; but this 
resemblance is a non-intentional resemblance.  
 
We have seen, so far, the outlines of two kinds of fundamental consideration, which point in 
different directions. On the one hand, the empirical intentionality of sensible intuition appears to be 
necessary for genuine content, and this is an intentionality that is distinctively vertical. On the other 
hand, this kind of vertical intentionality would seem impossible, given that no intentional 
relationship can hold between what is propositional and what is not. This is the dilemma that 
presents itself at the beginning of McDowell’s Mind and World. That work is intended to resolve the 
dilemma by showing us that finding a place for vertical intentionality does not force us into the 
Myth of the Given. I believe that it succeeds and shall drawn on its lessons in section IV of this 
project. 
 
I have not considered, as a picture of intentionality, model-theoretic semantics for natural language 
of the kind developed by linguistic semanticists. This is because I do not think that these are pictures 
of intentionality. I think that these are models intended to show up semantic compositionality. That 
they could not be pictures of intentionality is obvious as soon as one considers that intensionality 
(with an ‘s’) receives, in these models, a quasi-extensionalization in terms of possible worlds. The 
role in our intentional activity of expressions like ‘believes that’ and ‘ought’ is not explained 
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irreducibly in the vocabulary of possible worlds (though it might be explained irreducibly in the 
vocabulary of possibilities, understood not as model-theoretic objects but in terms, say, of inferential 
proprieties; I do not think that one is entitled to insist that everything bottom out in the indicative and 
the categorical).  
 
Of course, such models do more than show up compositionality. They also show up inference. For 
no one would do semantics with possible worlds unless we could capture the entailment of 
 there is a bag of potatoes in my house 
from 
 there is a bag of potatoes in my pantry 
as we clearly do, given that every world in which there is a bag of potatoes in my pantry is one in 
which there is a bag of potatoes in my house. And so even though ‘pantry’ may denote, in such 
models, a function from worlds to sets of particulars, this does not mean that inference has no role 
to play here; for the content of this function, as it were, is pushed into the metalanguage, where 
inferential proprieties (such as that governing the inference from ‘there is a bag of potatoes in my 
pantry’ to ‘there is a bag of potatoes in my house’) are the means by which we assess the theory as 
an adequate model of sentential compositionality. 
 
And there are, of course, dynamic semanticists. Irene Heim’s file-change semantics allows us to 
derive a sentence’s truth-conditions from its context-change potential, which sounds an awful lot like 
“inferential role”[DINP]. My point is not to say anything terribly precise but rather to insist that one 
may talk intelligibly about predicates as having their meanings constituted by their inferential roles 
and also engage in model-theoretic (or some other variety of) truth-conditional semantics. One does 
not have to say that sense should be defined either in terms of an expression’s contribution to truth-
conditions, or in terms of inferential proprieties. One does not even have to say which is more 
“fundamental”.  
 
But I digress. I shall here explore the themes of interest to me within the problematic of 
inferentialism. But mine is not Robert Brandom’s strong inferentialism [RIP]. Christopher Peacocke, 
against Brandom’s view, insists that inferential rules determine a concept only if they fix a semantic 
value [RR p. 55]. I agree, and, as we shall see, on my view it is ensured that the inferential rules 
governing our use of empirical predicates determine extensions for those predicates. Indeed, they 
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determine such extensions in an interesting sense. That is, they do not say merely that the extension 
of ‘lump of sodium’ is a collection of lumps of sodium. They make explicit what it is to be a lump of 
sodium. In this way, fact enters into meaning, and intension determines extension.  
 
It might be useful to consider the view I explore and develop a weak inferentialism, according to which 
language is an essentially inferentially-articulated system, though such articulation is not sufficient to 
constitute content. The canvas that is our linguistic system must have a plurality of intentional 
threads linking it with the stuff of the world: it cannot be merely “causally informed” by the world, 
in Jay Rosenberg’s oxymoronic idiom, or anchored only at the edges.  
 
My project here, to be more explicit, is to indicate the outlines of the foundations of linguistic 
meaning in a way that locates vertical and horizontal intentionality in their proper places and in their 
proper relation to each other. This is a task in locating the origin at which the two axes of 
significance intersect. The answer I shall give is that this origin is inductive. Induction, I shall 
suggest, is essential to the emergence of significance. The inferentially-articulated linguistic system 
stands in a relation of vertical intentionality to the causally-articulated world, and this relation is 
essentially constituted, at least in part, inductively.  
 
What follows is a brief summary of the project.  
 
In section II, “The Inductive Inertia of Sheer Sensuality”, I introduce, via a Sellarsian digression, one 
of the broad themes of the project: the centrality of inductive projectibility in the emergence of 
significance. Although Sellars does not, in his “Phenomenalism” (PH), which serves as the text for 
section II, discuss intentionality directly, his view of theoretical explanation which, as we shall see, is 
very closely linked to the rejection of vertical intentionality by Rosenberg, is central to his argument 
against the phenomenalist. The centrality of inductive projectibility emerges here in his discussion of 
justifiable generalizations of purely phenomenal regularities, which, Sellars argues, are impossible. 
 
Section III, “Making Moves in the Space of Reasons”, consists in my making explicit some of the 
features of inferentialist theories of meaning that I wish to appropriate for my purposes. I shall 
propose that empirical predicates may be understood as having content that is embodied in 
principles of material inference whose adoption on our part is inductively justified. This section will 
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draw on Sellars’s theory of induction and Rosenberg’s theory of theoretical explanation, which is 
paired naturally with his inferentialism, and according to which perceptual-conceptual representings 
as I conceive them play no essential role in the emergence of significance.  
 
Having suggested in section III that the adoption of principles of material inference that constitute 
the content of empirical predicates is justified by inductions, in section IV, “Objects in View”, I 
focus on what such inductions are from: observations; that is, conceptual-perceptual representings with 
singular demonstrative content. I insist that the Sellarsian inferentialist cannot rewrite such canonical 
cases of reference in inferential terms, lest we lose our grip on the genuine objectivity of empirical 
intentionality; and that the alternative I embrace—that is, understanding the logic and epistemology 
of singular demonstrative content according to the disjunctive conception of experience—does not 
land us in the Myth of the Given. This section draws essentially on the work of John McDowell and 
Bill Brewer. 
 
In section V, “The Horizontal and the Vertical: a Kantian Reanimation”, I draw parallels between 
elements of my own view—in particular, the inductive constitution of empirical predicates—with 
elements of Kant’s picture of the epistemic-cum-intentional—in particular, the generation of 
empirical concepts by comparison, abstraction, and reflection as discussed in Béatrice Longuenesse’s 
Kant and the Capacity to Judge. Drawing further on Longuenesse’s work, I gesture at one way of 
beginning to make sense of how perceptual-conceptual representings with essentially referential 
content are inferentially discursive even in their aspect as perceptual: that is, as shapings of sensory 
consciousness. My focus will be on temporality. This will be (a gesture towards) one particular way 
of making sense of McDowell’s suggestion that perception is conceptually structured. 
 
In section VI, “Intending the possible: Meaning and Modal Epistemology”, I shall discuss one 
consequence of the picture of intentionality that I shall have explored. It is that empirical predicates 
are so constituted that they cannot be used contrary to the inferential proprieties that govern them. 
This may seem obvious—indeed, it is—but it has what might be considered hyperconservative 
consequences with respect to the epistemology of modality. Luckily, this is exactly what I want. I 
shall suggest that “conceivability” and “intuitions of possibility” need not have any role whatever in 
our investigations into the possible. And, indeed, I shall urge that our knowledge of the possible, 
because of semantic limitations, is limited to knowledge of the possibilities for our world, causally 
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articulated as it is. For empirical meaning belongs to its makers: us and our world. We make it 
together, to the end of having in view the one empirical reality that is our home.  
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II. The Inductive Inertia of Sheer Sensuality 
This short section is devoted to the exegesis and recasting of an argument given in Sellars’s PH. 
Sellars’s announced objective is to understand the inadequacy of phenomenalism before we abandon 
it, lest we recapitulate its inadequacies later in a different guise. Let us consider, with Sellars, a brand 
of phenomenalism whose dogma might be summarized in the following slogan: physical objects are 
patterns of actual and possible sense contents. We shall assume that we can make sense of what “sense 
contents” are: in brief, their esse is their percipi. Further, it is not the case, according to the kind of 
phenomenalism that is here of interest, that  
(1) S has a sensation of a red triangle 
is logically equivalent to 
(2) S is in a perceptual state that is brought about in normal circumstances by the action of red 
and triangular physical objects on the eyes. 
 
Supposing that we can make sense of actual sense contents, we must ask what a possible sense content 
is. Let us consider, as an aid to answering the question, other event-like things whose possibility we 
like to discuss. Gertrude is a good driver, and when she’s behind the wheel, skids scarcely ever 
eventuate. But even for her, there are possible skids: skids that do not eventuate, but that might 
have, if the circumstances had been different. What is required for us to be justified in believing that 
E would have eventuated, had A occurred in circumstances C? Sellars’s answer, which I accept, is 
that, in order to be justified in believing the counterfactual, we must be justified in believing in a 
general factual truth of the form 
(3) When A occurs in C, E eventuates.1 
Since statements conforming to schema (3) are not analytic, belief in such statements is inductively 
justified. If we are ever justified in any of our beliefs about possible sense contents, we must be 
justified in believing some statements conforming to schema (3), where ‘A’, ‘C’ and ‘E’ are replaced 
by expressions constructed entirely from the vocabulary of actual sense contents. And since the way 
to justify statements conforming to schema (3) is induction, such statements must be justified by 
induction. 
 
Why must it be that ‘A’, ‘C’ and ‘E’ are replaced by expressions constructed entirely from the 
vocabulary of actual sense contents? Given the aim of the phenomenalist—viz., to characterize 
                                                
1 Similarly, to be justified in believing that the rock would have hit the ledge, had it been dropped, one must be justified 
in believing that rocks hit ledges when dropped (under certain specifiable circumstances). 
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physical objects as patterns of actual and possible sense contents—drawing on the vocabulary of 
physical objects is foreclosed as a possibility, on pain of a circulo in definiendo. Similar reasoning 
excludes the vocabulary of possible sense contents: since we have characterized the notion of a 
possible sense content in terms of statements conforming to schema (3), such statements cannot 
include the vocabulary of possible sense contents. 
  
Are there statements conforming to schema (3) in which ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ are replaced by expressions 
constructed solely from the vocabulary of actual sense contents? Sellars argues that there are no such 
statements. The argument proceeds thus. First, we make a distinction between types of inductive 
generalizations:  
(4) Accidentally autobiographical generalizations: these are generalizations that are such that, whenever 
I have pattern P of sense contents, I have a sense content of the kind K, where it makes 
good sense to suppose that the generalization remains true if ‘anybody’ is substituted for ‘I’.  
(5) Essentially autobiographical generalizations: these are generalizations that are such that, whenever 
I have pattern P of sense contents, I have a sense content of the kind K, where it is clear that 
the generalization would not remain true if ‘anybody’ were substituted for ‘I’ 
 
Now suppose, for the moment, that there are indeed inductively establishable generalizations 
supported by instantial inductive arguments the premises of which refer to actual sense contents 
only. This, Sellars thinks is not—at least not immediately—implausible, because there are clear 
regularities in my sense history. We may now ask whether these regularities may inductively support 
essentially autobiographical generalizations (“E-generalizations”), accidentally autobiographical 
generalizations (“A-generalizations”), or both. 
  
Sellars argues first that, though they may support E-generalizations, they cannot support A-
generalizations. (He later goes on to deny that they may support even E-generalizations.) Here is the 
argument. Though there are indeed regularities in my sense history, that there are these regularities is 
tied inexitricably with my being in the particular environment in which I am. I am not entitled to 
generalize these regularities to others who are not in my environment; so I am not entitled to A-
generalizations. 
 
Unless I am entitled, on the basis of these regularities of sense history, to A-generalizations, the 
phenomenalist’s goal of defining physical objects in terms of possible sense contents is impossible to 
achieve. This is because we cannot be justified in believing statements conforming to schema (3), as 
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is obvious, given that I am not entitled to A-generalizations; and being justified in believing 
statements conforming to schema (3) was taken to be a necessary condition of being justified in 
believing in the possibility of E, the having of a certain sense content. So I can never be justified in 
believing in an agent’s possibly having a sense content. So the phenomenalist is thwarted: physical 
objects cannot be reduced to actual and possible sense contents. For surely I can be justified in my 
beliefs about physical objects; but I can never be justified in my beliefs about possible sense 
contents.2 
  
And now, Sellars argues further that regularities in my sense history cannot support even E-
generalizations. To support my E-generalizations, I have to have selected some patterns of sensory 
experience as antecedents of the generalizations in question. On what basis might I have made this 
selection? Sellars contends that there can be no such basis without reference to the “specific physical 
environment in which we do our perceiving and of the general principles which correlate the 
occurrence of sensations with bodily and environmental conditions.” That the uniformities I have 
selected are dependent in this way on the very objects in my environment is easy to see: if these 
objects are removed, and replaced by others, or if one’s environment changes, the uniformities 
cease. No sense-content predicate is projectible on its own: reference to the physical is essential.  
 
 
 
  
                                                
2 I take the phenomenalist’s project to be that of justifying (or showing justified) our beliefs about physical objects via 
our beliefs about sense data. The failure of the project is the failure of the phenomenalist’s way of justifying (or showing 
justified) our beliefs about physical objects. But it does not follow from this failure that any project must fail whose aim 
is to justify (or to show justified) our beliefs about physical objects. Indeed, some such project must succeed, since (at 
least some of) our beliefs about physical objects are justified. This last I take as a datum. 
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2. Exploration. 
 
III. Making Moves in the Space of Reasons 
 
Section II gave me occasion to introduce a theme of especial importance to my project: that of 
induction. I recommended that we take seriously Sellars’s putative demonstration that phenomenal 
vocabulary is unprojectible: that is, that statements written entirely in phenomenal vocabulary cannot 
be inductively justified. Inductive justification of statements, Sellars argues, requires that these 
statements be formulated in the vocabulary of observable physical objects. Sellars’s aim in PH is not, 
however, merely to demonstrate that phenomenal vocabulary is unprojectible. It is rather to 
diagnose the source of the inadequacy of phenomenalism, the view that the language of observable 
physical objects is a theoretical language that serves as the explanans of which statements formulated 
in phenomenal vocabulary are the explananda. (Statements are not themselves explananda; rather, it is 
the facts to which they correspond—or, to put it more neutrally, the empirical phenomena that they 
describe—that are explained, but I shall retain sloppy expression where unproblematic.) According 
to Sellars’s theory of theoretical explanation, theories explain the behavior of objects by showing 
why such objects conform to inductively confirmed laws our statements of which are formulated in 
non-theoretical vocabulary. If phenomenalism is true, then the theory of physical objects explains 
the behavior of mere phenomena by showing why these phenomena conform to inductively 
confirmed laws our statements of which are formulated entirely in phenomenal vocabulary. But 
there can be no such inductively confirmed laws; so phenomenalism is false. 
 
I recommend that we go further than Sellars’s conclusion, and say that no language lacking 
projectible predicates—that is, no language in whose vocabulary no justifiable inductive 
generalizations could be formulated—should count as a natural language at all. We see why we 
should follow my recommendation when we ask ourselves what our language would be like if all our 
predicates were like Goodman’s ‘grue’.  
 
This thought is perhaps enough to convince us that natural languages must contain projectible 
vocabulary. In this second part of my project I explore a picture of empirical intentionality in which 
the role of this projectibility is more fully explicated. Projectible vocabulary, and, correlatively, 
inductive justification, play an essential role in our intentional-cum-epistemic activity. I wish to locate 
and identify this role and at the same time discuss what I believe to be important insights from two 
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pictures of such activity: the picture of intentionality as vertical, and that of intentionality as 
horizontal. In this section, I appropriate elements from one variation on the theme of horizontal 
intentionality: inferentialism. 
 
The most manifest (though of course not all) of the exponents of inferentialism have been 
philosophers working in the Sellarsian tradition, a heterogeneous group that it is dangerous for me 
to treat, as I often shall, as though its members were all of a piece. Here I intend to sketch the barest 
outlines of a Sellarsian inferentialism by drawing on the work of Jay Rosenberg, Robert Brandom, 
and Sellars himself.  
 
We may begin by gesturing at the kind of picture with which inferentialists take issue. It is a picture 
of meaning as relational: linguistic objects, on this picture, stand in intentional relations to objects in 
the world. A sentence may stand in an intentional relation to a fact, where this relation is the 
correspondence that constitutes truth. A singular term—a name, say, or a demonstrative 
expression—may stand in an intentional relation to an object, where this relation is that of reference. A 
one-place predicate—say ‘is red’—may stand in an intentional relation to a property, redness. An n-
place predicate may stand in an intentional relation to an n-place relation. And so on. 
 
Let us consider the case of predicates, which seems less clear than that of singular terms and 
sentences. Sellars does not believe that characterizing the semantics of predicates in terms of 
properties and relations is elucidatory, because he does not believe that properties or relations exist.3 
A nominalist, he suggests that we try moving in the reverse direction, that we characterize the nature 
of properties and relations in terms of predicates. Having made this move, we are left with no theory 
of meaning for predicates: for if talk of properties is merely talk of predicate in the material mode 
(to appropriate the Carnapian locution), then it adds nothing to our understanding of ‘is red’ to say 
that it bears a relation of any kind to redness. 
  
Sellars must offer a replacement for the picture of vertical intentionality that he wishes us to dismiss.  
And this he does. He proposes that the meaning of an expression is constituted by the functional role 
it plays in language. We may characterize the functional role of an expression ‘e’, in Sellarsian 
notation, by saying that ‘e’ is a !e!. We may consider, as an example, the word ‘and’, which is a 
                                                
3 See, for example, his EAE. 
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!and!. Other words that are !and!s are the German word ‘und’ and the French word ‘et’. To say 
that ‘und’ is a !and! is to say what ‘und’ means.  
 
The functional role of a linguistic expression is its use. There is a question in this connection 
whether we should construe use descriptively or normatively. We might say, for example, that for 
‘and’ to be a !and!--which is for ‘and’ to be used the way !and!s are—is for English speakers to 
have certain dispositions. Or we might say that it is for English speakers to have certain semantic 
obligations—in Brandom’s idiom, to undertake certain commitments. It is not within the scope of 
my project to elaborate my own choice in any detail. But it will be observed that I am sympathetic to 
the latter view. My tone of voice, when I talk about use, is normative. 
 
So far, this suggestion—that meaning is use—is a mere platitude. In order to reveal its substance, we 
must ask in what the use of a linguistic expression consists: we must ask what a linguistic expression 
is used to do. Let us consider ‘and’, and !and!s more generally. We may observe that, having 
inscribed ‘P and Q’, I may inscribe ‘P’, by an operation of ‘and’-elimination. If I have inscribed ‘P’, and 
elsewhere ‘Q’, then I may inscribe ‘P and Q’, by an operation of ‘and’-introduction. A !and! is 
something that shares the introduction and elimination rules of ‘and’. These rules for ‘and’ govern 
inferences involving ‘and’. Here, then, is the answer to the question what a linguistic expression is 
used to do. It is used to make inferences, to make moves in the space of reasons. 
 
The rules of introduction and elimination for !and!s are principles of formal inference, because ‘and’ 
and the rest of its functional cohort are bits of logical vocabulary. But the kind of inferentialism here 
under consideration demands that such principles of formal inference not exhaust the norms 
governing our intentional activity. For we must take account of non-logical vocabulary as well, the 
meaning of which is constituted by principles of material inference. Material inferences are those in 
which, roughly speaking, non-logical vocabulary occurs non-vacuously. Note that this is not the case 
with respect to the inferences we considered above. Consider the inference from ‘P and Q’ to ‘P’. 
Here the non-logical vocabulary did occur vacuously: there was nothing about ‘P’ and ‘Q’ as such 
that drove the inference. It was all in the ‘and’. But consider the inference from ‘a is east of b’ to ‘b is 
west of a’. We cannot in general move from a sentence of the form ‘a is F of b’ to another of the 
form ‘b is G of a’, where adjectives are substituted for ‘F’ and ‘G’. What is driving the inference here 
is the non-logical vocabulary; in this case, ‘east’ and ‘west’. 
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We may consider another example, different from the preceding in important respects. Having 
uttered ‘it’s raining’, I am entitled to utter ‘the streets will be wet’, by an application, so to say, of the 
rule of ‘rain’-elimination. An inferentialist may claim that this inference is valid—materially valid—
without the addition of the premise ‘if it’s raining, then the streets will be wet’. But the principle of 
‘rain’-elimination is no mere material conditional. We might put it thus: “that it’s raining implies that 
the streets will be wet”, where we use ‘that’ in place of quotation. To such principles some species of 
necessity attaches. They support counterfactuals, and their corresponding conditionals, when written 
in the material mode, are best rendered in the subjunctive: “if it be raining, then the streets should 
be wet.” 
 
The sentence and its inferential relations to other sentences emerge as the central characters in our 
semantic story. Let us now entertain the following claim: that the meaning of a sentence is 
exhaustively characterized by an account of the inferential relations in which it stands to other 
sentences; and the meaning of a subsentential expression is exhaustively characterized by an account 
of its role in inference. Let us call this view, following Brandom, the strong inferentialist thesis. [RIP] 
Intentionality is, on this view, purely horizontal. The intentionality of a language consists in its 
inferentially-articulated structure. The meaning of each bit of language is exhaustively constituted by 
its place in this inferential network.  
  
We have had no recourse, in sketching this strong inferentialist picture, to the vertical-intentional 
notions of truth and reference. But these are, we may contend—I certainly do—essential to our 
understanding of intentionality. The Sellarsian inferentialist takes this concern seriously, and seeks a 
place for truth and reference within her picture of intentionality as horizontal. Recall that paradigm 
cases of linguistic expressions that stand in relations of reference to objects in the world are proper 
names and demonstrative expressions; these are paid special attention by Brandom, Rosenberg, and 
others. Whether their accounts of truth and reference are satisfactory cannot be decided until we 
have considered these notions in their own right and the epistemological notions with which they 
are correlative. Such consideration is the object of Section IV. 
  
Just as the strong inferentialist has a challenging task in finding a place for truth and reference, so 
she does in giving a satisfactory account of empirical knowledge. We may consider, as a paradigm of 
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empirical knowledge, the kind of observational knowledge that is expressed in a sentence containing 
singular demonstrative elements. It is via the referential relations in which such singular elements 
stand to objects in the world, we are tempted to say, that we may have knowledge of those objects. 
But referential relations with epistemic, hence intentional purport cannot be characters in the 
inferentialist’s story of the fundament of intentionality; for to conceive of reference as intentional is 
to conceive of meaning as relational, something that the strong inferentialist cannot do. I may, to be 
sure, know that this is a cat before me; and knowing this does in part involve standing in some relation 
to this very cat: even the strong inferentialist must acknowledge this. But it is the nature of this 
relation that is under question: is it intentional-cum-epistemic, or merely causal and matter-of-factual?4 If it is 
intentional, just what kind of intentional relationship is it? 
  
It is not immediately obvious why we should worry about this question. For surely the inferentialist 
will have told a satisfactory story if she has told us a story about our language’s representation of the 
world—surely this is the heart of the matter. And it is indeed, according to both Sellars and 
Rosenberg, the raison d’être of an intentional system is to represent the world. But, as will emerge 
over the course of this and the next section, it is not clear that the “representational” relations that 
connect language and world, are, on the Sellarsian view, robustly intentional—though the matter is 
complex, and different authors seem to differ on this point, at least in emphasis if not in doctrine. 
Sellars writes that, on his view, 
 
…the ultimate point of all the logical powers pertaining to conceptual activity in its epistemic 
orientation is to generate conceptual structures which as objects in nature stand in certain 
matter-of-factual relations to other objects in nature. [KTE p. 52, EPH; my emphasis] 
 
That this is the ultimate point is underscored by Rosenberg’s elaboration of a picture of the 
development of our representation of the world: 
 
We now have a view of language as theory writ large—a structure of entries and inferences 
evolving to higher and higher states of coherence and integration under the continuing 
impact of anomalous experiential inputs. It is in this causal evolutionary conception of word-
world relations that the answer to our original puzzle will lie. [LR p.95; emphasis in original] 
 
                                                
4 Because both the inferentialist and I intend ‘intentionality’ broadly enough to include the epistemic and logical 
domains, I shall henceforth employ ‘intentional’ or ‘epistemic’, as felicity requires, and abandon the unwieldy ‘epistemic-
cum-intentional’ and ‘intentional-cum-epistemic’. 
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These matter-of-factual relations obtain between language and world insofar as both language and 
world are objects in nature. These may be merely matter-of-factual and causal; or they may be 
intentional as well. But the import of this distinction—between intentional and non-intentional 
“representational” relations—is at this point not yet clear. The pertinent clarification will emerge 
over the course of this and the next section.  
 
Let us consider part of what we do, as linguistic and epistemic agents, toward generating conceptual 
structures that stand in a representational relation to nature. Let us consider something that arose in 
a different connection in section II: instantial induction. We perform inductions toward the end of 
adopting hypotheses about nature against which to evaluate scientific theories. If we, following 
Rosenberg, conceive of language as “theory writ large”, we begin to see what induction might have 
to do with language. 
 
We might represent the schema of an inductive argument thus: 
 This F is G 
 This F is G 
 … 
 Therefore, all F are G 
 
Or, generalizing: 
m/n of our finite sample K of F have been G 
 Therefore, m/n of all F are G. 
 
I shall consider only arguments conforming to the first, less general schema, for ease of exposition.  
 
Inductive arguments, as usually conceived, vary in their inductive strength. The stronger an inductive 
argument, the more reason we have to accept its conclusion. But, no matter how strong, an 
inductive argument is yet invalid. Any argument that is valid is, after all, deductive. 
  
Sellars, and Rosenberg following him, reject this treatment of induction. Indeed, they reject the very 
idea of an inductive “argument”, whose support for its conclusion may vary in inductive “strength”.5 
Instead, they claim, all arguments are deductive. What have been characterized as inductive 
                                                
5 The following exposition borrows from, and modifies, discussion in IV and LR, Ch. V. 
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“arguments” are in fact second-level schemata pointing to two (deductive) arguments: (i) a first-level 
probability argument, schematized 
 … 
 therefore, it is probable that-p 
 
and (ii) a third-level practical argument, schematized 
 … 
 therefore, I shall accept that-p. 
 
The role of (i) is to demonstrate that the premises are available for a good and valid argument whose 
conclusion is that of (ii).  
  
Sellars analyzes ‘it is probable that-p’ thus:  
 there is a good argument of one or another certain patterns for accepting that-p 
from which it is clear, given obvious assumptions about the nature of practical reasoning, that an 
argument conforming to (i), if sound, establishes that there is a good and valid argument whose 
conclusion is that of (ii). That is, if an argument conforming to (i) is sound, then it establishes its 
conclusion, i.e., that there is a good argument of one or another certain patterns for accepting that p. 
The only kind of argument for accepting that-p is a practical argument whose conclusion is 
‘therefore, I shall accept that-p’. So (i), if sound, establishes the existence of a good argument 
conforming to schema (ii). 
 
To appreciate the mechanics of Sellarsian induction, let us approach the problem slightly differently. 
Consider again the schema of a simple inductive argument 
  
 This F is G 
 This F is G 
 … 
 Therefore, all F are G. 
 
If we attempt to construct a deductive argument from the premises of the above, we may write 
 This F is G 
 This F is G 
 … 
 Therefore, that all F are G stands in R to e 
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where e is whatever evidence is relevant to the proposition in question, here embodied in the 
premises, and R a relation in which that all F are G stands to e.  
 
Why, we ask, does it matter that that all F are G stands in R to e? That is, why does this relation R 
have any epistemic import? The answer is that it does not, at least not on its own. Such relations are 
normatively inert unless embedded in the context of a normative epistemology. What we need is to 
have rationally adopted, in the context of such an epistemology, an instance of a policy, thus: 
 I shall accept that all F are G when it stands in R to e. 
 
What would justify the adoption of such a policy? If adoption of such a policy were analytically 
implied by a commitment to a given end E—that is, if 
 ‘I shall bring about E’ analytically implies ‘I shall accept that-p when it stands in R to e’ 
were true, and I were indeed committed to E, then I should be justified in accepting the policy in 
question.   
 
We may now consider the meta-probability implication statement 
 that [that all F are G stands in R to e] makes it probable that that all F are G is true 
which may be rewritten, according to Sellars’s analysis of ‘probable’, thus: 
that [that all F are G stands in R to e] implies that there is a good and valid argument for the 
conclusion ‘I shall accept that all F are G’. 
 
This statement points up the good and valid argument   
 I shall bring about E 
 ‘I shall bring about E’ analytically implies ‘I shall accept that-p when it stands in R to e’ 
 I shall accept that-p when it stands in R to e 
 that all F are G stands in R to e 
 therefore I shall accept that all F are G 
 
which conforms to scheme (ii) in our original formulation of Sellarsian induction.  
 
 
But this is not quite right. The end of instantial induction is not, according to Sellars, an empirical 
statement, like ‘all F are G’, but a principle of inference, and in particular a principle of material inference. 
The above scheme must be thus modified: 
 
 I shall bring about E 
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 Bringing about E logically implies accepting a principle of inference when it stands in R to e 
 I shall accept a principle of inference when it stands in R to e 
 that x is F implies that x is G stands in R to e 
 therefore I shall accept [that x is F implies that x is G]. 
 
Now that we have replaced empirical hypotheses by principles of material inference, we may answer 
the question what E and R are.  
 
E is the state of being able to draw inferences concerning the composition with respect to a given 
property G of unexamined finite samples of a kind, F, in a way which also provides an explanatory 
account of the composition with respect to G of the total examined sample, e, of F.6 
 
And to say that a principle of inference stands in R to e is to say that it accords with e, the observed 
facts. It is clear, Sellars claims, that adopting the end E analytically implies adopting the policy 
 I shall adopt a principle of inference when it stands in R to e, 
since, 
In the first place,… to draw inferences one must, logically, be committed to or accept 
principles of inference… 
In the second place, to draw an inference concerning the composition of an unexamined finite 
sample of a kind [F], the principle must, logically, be of the form 
 that x is F implies that x is G 
And in the third place, [because to give an explanatory account of e] one must, logically, 
assert that the composition in question is the most statistically probable composition on the 
basis of the finite population of [F]s which are known to exist but of which only the 
members of [our finite sample] have been examined. [IV §53-55] 
 
In sum, then, what Sellars calls the terminal outcome of an instantial induction is the adoption of a 
principle of inference. The end-in-view of adopting new principles of inference on empirical 
grounds is the state of being able to draw inferences concerning the composition of the very finite 
samples on which we induced. Adopting such principles of inference is an analytic implication of 
one’s commitment to this end. Relative to this end, then, induction is justified. 
 
I wish to adopt Sellars’s view that the terminal outcome of an instantial induction is the adoption of 
a principle of material inference, which serves, apart from anything else, to do part of the work of 
explaining the observations, e, that inspired its adoption. Adopting 
                                                
6 Here my notation is sloppy: I have used ‘e’ to talk about the sample, and to talk about the claims of interest that we can 
make about the sample.  
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 That x is F implies that x is G 
allows us to move from 
 a is F 
to 
 a is G 
with no extra premises.  
 
But what exactly are we explaining when we explain that a is G, or that this F is G? What we are 
explaining is an observation. It might not seem that appeal to such a principle of inference should 
explain that this F is G; after all, all we are doing is identifying that this F is G as an instance of, as we 
say, in the material mode, all F are G. To render this universally quantified statement in the 
subjunctive, or to make it a principle of material inference, clarifies perhaps that it is supposed to be 
explanatory, but not why.  If we fill in a few more details of the Sellarsian story about explanation, we 
see that Sellars makes an observation in this spirit. 
 
Sellars describes theoretical explanation as, on what he calls the “standard view”, being structured in 
the following way (in TE, LT, and, as we have seen, PH). Theories that explain inductive 
generalizations G1…Gn consist of two sets of propositions. The first is that of the postulates and 
theorems of a deductive system, whose vocabulary is that of logic, mathematics, and the distinctive 
vocabulary of the science in question, exhausted by the primitive and defined terms of the theory. 
(In LT Sellars adds to these the vocabulary of space and time.) The second is that of correspondence 
rules correlating expressions formulated using the defined terms of the theory with the empirical 
predicates in G1…Gn. The correspondence rules are so chosen that ideally they correlate the 
inductively established generalizations G1…Gn with theorems in the deductive system, and correlate 
no theorem in the deductive system with an inductively disconfirmed empirical generalization.  
 
The term ‘empirical predicate’ is intended to cover observation predicates and predicates defined in 
terms of observation predicates and logical vocabulary. The connection between empirical 
vocabulary and induction is this: fruitful empirical predicates, Sellars says, are those which occur in 
inductively confirmed generalizations. [TE, EPH, p.443] It is clear from remarks elsewhere that 
Sellars intends ‘empirical predicate’ to coïncide with the vocabulary of the Carnapian “physical-thing 
language” [LT §5, SPR p.107]. I prefer the terms ‘empirical vocabulary’ and ‘observation 
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framework’, since the Carnapian idiom suggests that all physical things belong to the “physical-thing 
framework”, when, in fact, many—mu mesons, for example—do not. 
 
Note that, according to the “standard view” of theoretical explanation, what theories explain are 
inductive generalizations formulated in empirical vocabulary—“which task is equated with deriving 
the [inductive generalizations] from the theory by means of the correspondence rules” [LT §5, SPR 
p.107]. A theory that explained why all F are G (or, if we have adopted, as I have, Sellars’s theory of 
induction, ‘that x is F implies that x is G’) would derive this generalization, by means of 
correspondence rules, from a theory whose sentences are constructed from the vocabularies of logic, 
mathematics, space and time, and the science in question. And then individual observations, which 
are statements of singular empirical matters of fact—say, that this F is G—are explained in virtue of 
their being instances of the inductive generalizations. There are, then, three levels in the hierarchy of 
explanation. There are the unexplained explainers, i.e., the postulates and theorems of the theory in 
question; the explained explainers, i.e., the inductive generalizations that are derived from the theory 
by means of correspondence rules; and the explained non-explainers, i.e. the singular matters of fact 
that are derived as instances of the inductive generalizations. Explanation, on this “standard view”, 
is characterized entirely in terms of derivation. 
 
But this “standard view” is, according to Sellars, not quite right—we saw already, in section II, that 
his account differs— and its mistake lies precisely in its identifying explanation with derivation. He 
writes: 
…to conceive of the explananda of theories as, simply, empirical laws and to equate theoretical 
explanation with the derivation of empirical laws from theoretical postulates by means of 
logic, mathematics, and correspondence rules is to sever the vital tie between theoretical 
principles and particular matters of fact in the framework of observation. [LT §40, SPR 
p.121, emphasis in the original] 
 
The correct account of explanation is, instead, that theories about observable things 
explain empirical laws by explaining why observable things obey to the extent that they do, these empirical 
laws; that is, they explain why individual objects of various kinds and in various 
circumstances in the observation framework behave in those ways in which it has been 
inductively established that they do behave. [LT §40, SPR p.121, emphasis in the original] 
 
Once we have an inductive generalization (as we say in the material mode; we ought rather to say 
“principle of material inference”), we do perhaps have an explanation, relative to certain explanatory 
requirements, of why this particular F is G: the explanation is that being F implies being G. But if we 
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ask, in turn, why this should be the case, what we are really asking is this: why do objects behave in 
this way? That is, why are objects such that their being F implies that they are G? And to this 
question our inductive generalization (principle of material inference) alone is inadequate. What we 
need is a theory. It is of the essence of a theory that it explain why observations—statements of 
singular empirical fact, hence formulated in empirical vocabulary, the vocabulary of the observation 
framework— adhere to inductive generalizations which are themselves constructed from the 
vocabulary of this framework. This is the “vital tie between theoretical principles and particular 
matters of fact in the framework of observation” that Sellars does not want us to sever. 
 
It must be noted at this stage that Sellars is not, in LT, concerned primarily to emphasize the 
importance of observations—which is clearly my own aim—but instead to argue (i) that theories are 
not merely dispensable notational conventions: hence his emphatic declaration that, without a theory 
to explain why inductive generalizations are true of their instances, science is not science at all; and 
(ii) that one of the ends of theoretical explanation is the replacement of the observation framework by 
the theoretical framework. I embrace (i), though it is not of immediate relevance to my project. But 
in light of my concern to show how seriously Sellars takes observation, (ii) may surprise us. What 
exactly does he intend? The kind of replacement he envisages cannot be akin to the theoretical 
reduction (of, in the paradigm case, a microtheory to a micro-microtheory): for, as we saw in section 
II, Sellars rejects the characterization of the observation framework as a theory that explains a more 
basic framework (in that case, the phenomenal framework). There must, then, be an alternative 
conception of replacement. Sellars writes: 
The alternative, in general terms, will clearly be a view according to which the framework of 
physical things is a replaceable theory-like structure in a sense that does not involve a 
commitment to a deeper ‘level’ of observation and explanation. [LT §49, SPR p. 125] 
 
It is “theory-like”, presumably, insofar as its semantic structure is similar to that of a theory. That is, 
it has an inferentially-articulated structure. And yet it is not “theory-like” insofar as there is no deeper 
“level” of observation for it to explain. This latter difference is, in my view, of great epistemic—hence 
intentional and broadly logical—significance. Indeed, I contend, that an observation framework has 
this feature is part of why observation frameworks are essential to our epistemic commerce with the 
world. 
 
 25 
My contention does not, it seems, square with Sellars’s suggestion that the observation framework 
may be replaced by a theoretical framework. His is the same as the suggestion that the scientific image 
will eventually triumph over the manifest. (This vocabulary is from PSIM.) And after the victory, it is 
suggested, the correspondence rules and inductive generalizations will fall away, and the theory of 
the scientific image will stand, in inferential glory, on its own semantic feet—in precisely the way I 
claim, in accordance with the above contention, is impossible.  
 
In elaborating his own (very Sellarsian) picture of linguistic representation, this last—the claim that 
the theory of the scientific image can stand on its own semantic feet, without the aid of 
observations—is embraced wholeheartedly by Rosenberg:  
 
…the link between postulational theory and observational phenomena is not essentially 
mediated by pure observational generalizations of the classic inductive sort, however well-
supported they may be by the theoretical structure. [LR p.84] 
 
Observationality, on [my] account, is thus a de facto property of an empirical claim rather than 
an essential one. […] There are no logical reasons, in other words, for rejecting the possibility 
that the structure of theoretical concepts be entered directly, rather than by making an 
inferential stop at a bridge law, translation rule, or correspondence rule. [LR p.85] 
 
We should note a striking similarity between this last characterization, by Rosenberg, of his own 
position, and a characterization by John McDowell of a position held by Brandom: 
If something appropriately conceivable as sensory consciousness figures in our acquisition of 
observational knowledge, Brandom thinks that is a mere detail about the mechanism by 
which the relevant responsive dispositions work in our case. There could perfectly well be 
responsive dispositions that issue in knowledge-expressing claims without mediation by 
sensory consciousness, or at any rate sensory consciousness with a content matching that of 
the knowledge yielded by the dispositions. [WEPM p. 15] 
 
Sensory consciousness, we might put it, is, on Brandom’s view, a de facto character in the story of our 
acquisition of empirical knowledge. The issuing “in knowledge-expressing claims without mediation 
by sensory consciousness” parallels the direct entry of theoretical concepts, avoiding correspondence 
rules.  
 
It is important to distinguish the claim that observationality as such is logically inessential to empirical 
knowledge from the claim that the observation framework as it now happens to be is thus logically 
inessential. The observation framework of the twenty-first century is not the same as those of old. 
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As we augment our perceptual apparatus, we come into direct, observational contact with entities we 
had only postulated before. (I do not intend ‘only’ to carry a connotation of deprecation, only of 
discrimination: knowledge that is merely theoretical is to be distinguished from knowledge that is also 
observational.) We may, through the electron microscope, see the cell membrane, and penetrate it 
with a needle, and see that this is what we are doing. And when we do this, the cell membrane (and 
any of the other parts of the cell that we can see through the microscope) enter the observation 
framework. This is to say that the observation framework changes: it is not always and forever 
occupied merely by middle-size, middle-distance Aristotelian dry goods. 
 
There is a question just how much the observation framework could change. There are, presumably, 
some criteria for observationality as such. We might entertain pictures of the world in which trees, 
cats, and buildings fall away, and the observation framework is populated by cell membranes and 
mitochondria, brought into view by microscopes attached permanently to our faces. But I do not 
wish to speculate about whether human beings in such a situation would be in observational contact 
with such objects. (I doubt that human beings who could not see other human beings and other 
objects roughly our size could do much of anything, let alone engage in observational activity.) I 
wish only to suggest that not all properties of our current observation framework are necessary for 
observationality. This is enough to make the distinction between the claims (i) that observationality 
as such is logically inessential to empirical knowledge; and (ii) that our observation framework is 
logically inessential to empirical knowledge. 
 
Which of these two claims do the characters in our philosophical story—Sellars, Rosenberg, 
Brandom—accept? It is obvious that they all accept the second. And, indeed, so do I. The more 
interesting question is whether they also accept the first. It would seem, at first, on the basis of the 
passages I have quoted from Rosenberg, that he does: there is, in theoretical explanation, no essential 
mediation by “pure observational generalizations of the classic inductive sort”. He does not, 
presumably, intend to limit the application of ‘classic inductive sort’ to generalizations stated in the 
vocabulary of our observation framework, with all its contingent features over and above the 
necessary. But when we ask what role such “pure observational generalizations” were supposed to 
play, we see that the answer is that they were supposed to mediate between “postulational theory” 
and “observational phenomena”. It seems, then, that the observation framework does play an 
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essential role in explanation, according to Rosenberg. It must provide the phenomena that are to be 
explained. 
 
But his other remark would seem to undercut this: observationality—not just “observational 
generalizations of the classic inductive sort”, but observationality—is, he says, an inessential property 
of an empirical claim. To clarify his view, which is consistent in spite of this apparent tension, we 
must recall Sellars’s idea that the end of theoretical explanation is the replacement of the observation 
framework by the theoretical framework. In the story of this replacement the correspondence rules 
played an important role: they served to redefine the predicates of the observation framework in 
theoretical terms. This redefinition is called by Rosenberg “redescription”; and it is, according to 
Rosenberg, precisely this redescription in the terms of the theory that is explanation itself. Once this 
is done, we can throw the observation framework—and the correspondence rules—away. Indeed, it 
appears that, on Rosenberg’s view, the presence of “observational” vocabulary amounts to the 
presence of anomalies that require explanation by redescription in theoretical terms. And in light of 
this, we need not talk about “observational” vocabulary at all. For these anomalies may appear in the 
guise of theoretical inconsistencies. And this seems to accord well with Rosenberg’s historicist view 
of theoretical development. When one theory—classical mechanics, say—runs into phenomena that 
are inconsistent with it, what is really occurring is an internal inconsistency—in this case, an 
inconsistency between the theory of classical mechanics and a new piece of propositional content, 
with which we simply find ourselves, with which it is inconsistent.  
 
What motivates Rosenberg’s rejection of the necessity of observationality is his fear of running into 
the Myth of the Given. This consideration, central to Sellarsian epistemology, is thus recapitulated 
by Rosenberg: 
At the heart of Sellars’ epistemology is the rejection of the given. The world is not given to 
us; rather it acts on us. Our representations are responses elicited by a world to which our 
only cognitive access is provided by those representations themselves. The world is thus not 
an object of comparison against which such representations can be severally measured but a 
constraint to which they must be progressively and collectively attuned. The fundamental 
unit of knowledge is the whole system of representations, and an individual belief gains 
epistemic warrant from the fact and to the degree that it contributes to the collective 
adequacy of this systematic whole. The measure of such systematic adequacy, however, 
cannot be the degree of isomorphic fit between our representations and a represented world 
antecedently given but is rather the internal coherence of the system of representations as a 
whole and its stability in the face of the continued experiential impact of the represented 
world on us, the representers. [LRPN, §34] 
 28 
 
That “observation sentences”—like this F is G—are causally elicited by the presence of objects in the 
world is, it is suggested, a fact of no epistemic significance. Recall the distinction I drew between 
intentional and merely matter-of-factual relations, where the relata in question were linguistic or 
conceptual elements, on the one hand, and elements of the world, on the other. This distinction is 
correlative with the distinction between an observation’s bearing a relation of epistemic purport to 
an object in the world and an observation’s bearing a merely causal relation to an object in the 
world. The only means of epistemic appraisal, according to Rosenberg, is taking a measure of 
systematic adequacy: the “internal coherence of the system of representations as a whole”.  
 
Which is, I shall suggest, to say that there are no observations at all. Observations are precisely what 
Rosenberg here claims are impossible. For observations, I insist, are not just propositional contents 
accompanied by phenomenological events, courtesy of a causal hookup with the world, where such 
a hookup makes no extra epistemic difference. Rather, observations—where we use the term in all 
its factivity—are epistemically distinct takes on the world.  
 
What this means will not be made fully clear until the next section, nor will the respects in which my 
view differs from that of Rosenberg and Sellars. Indeed, the passage I have just quoted suggests a 
more extreme epistemic internalism than should be attributed to Sellars, given his views on 
observation, which are complex. Some of these complexities will feature in the next section as well. 
For now, I take stock of where we are. The inferentialist asks us to characterize the meaning of a 
sentence in terms of the inferential relations in which it stands to other sentences; and of a 
subsentential expression in terms of its role in such inferential relations. Such roles are embodied in 
principles of material inference, which may be made explicit, in the material mode, by rendering 
them in the subjunctive. According to Brandom’s strong inferentialist thesis, making explicit such 
inferential roles exhausts the task of semantics, for they embody all the meaning that is to be found 
in language.  
 
Sellars recommends that we understand inductive justification as justification of the adoption of 
such principles of material inference. The justification is abductive: adoption of a principle of 
inference is justified when it allows us to make inferences in a way that explains the composition of 
the pertinent finite inductive sample. What are explained are observations. It is not yet clear, at this 
stage, how we should characterize the status of observations in the epistemology with which 
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inferentialism is naturally paired, though it has been strongly suggested that observationality as such 
is epistemically unimportant. 
 
I wish to resist Brandom’s strong inferentialist thesis. But I wish to recommend the adoption of a 
weaker inferentialist thesis, according to which the meaning of a predicate should be understood in 
terms of its inferential role, as embodied in a principle of material inference which we may make 
explicit by rendering it in the subjunctive. And I wish to adopt Sellars’s suggestion that what we do 
when we induce is justify the adoption of just such a principle of inference. Putting the two together, 
I suggest that empirical predicates derive their meaning—as a logical, rather than a merely 
genealogical, matter—from such inductions. That is, the meaning of an empirical predicate—an 
observational predicate—is embodied in a principle of material inference the adoption of which 
must be inductively justified, in Sellars’s sense.  
 
I say “putting the two together”, but of course my suggestion does not follow from the weaker 
inferentialist thesis conjoined with Sellars’s account of induction. For Sellars need not hold that every 
empirical predicate’s meaning is embodied in a principle of material inference the adoption of which 
must be inductively justified. The rejection of observationality as such in Rosenberg, and of the 
necessity of inductive generalizations in particular, might suggest a view on which such principles of 
inference might be justified internally, by means of tests of consistency, simplicity, and so forth. 
 
But I, on the other hand, do hold that the meaning of an empirical predicate is embodied in a 
principle of material inference the adoption of which must be inductively justified. And, indeed, such 
is, on my view, constitutive of empirical predicates as such. Their corresponding principles of 
inference must be such that they explain the finitely many observations—e in the schemata of our 
previous discussion—that we say, in our non-Sellarsian tone of voice, lend them confirmatory 
support. (On my view, then, as on Rosenberg’s, induction is simply a special form of abduction: it is 
abduction from observations, where these are things with a certain epistemic status.) What is yet 
undecided is what an observation is. This is a topic for the next section. 
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IV. Objects in View 
 
I concluded section III with the following suggestion. The meaning of an empirical predicate is 
constituted by a principle of material inference, made explicit by rendering it in the subjunctive, that 
must be inductively justified in the sense of Sellars’s theory of induction: that is, it must allow us to 
explain the instances of the induction whose terminal outcome is its adoption.  I said that such 
instances were observations. Since empirical predicates must be inductively supported in terms of such 
observations, according to my view, if our language is to have empirical predicates at all (which it 
must, to be a language at all, since only empirical predicates are projectible, and since any language 
has projectible predicates, as we learned in section II), it must be that there are observations. And 
observations, I suggested, have a special epistemic status.  
 
This section is devoted to an exploration of just what this special epistemic status is. I shall also have 
to answer the challenge Rosenberg would pose: that is, I shall have to say how according 
observations such a special epistemic status is compatible with resisting the Myth of the Given. And 
I shall have to give support to my view that observations must have the status I wish to accord 
them. 
 
Let us begin by considering the context of Rosenberg’s brief recapitulation of the Sellarsian 
epistemology that I quoted above. It is an essay in which he constructs an inferentialist theory of 
proper names.7 Proper names are paradigmatic referring expressions, perhaps the paradigm of 
vertical intentionality. I said in the last section that accommodating proper names (and 
demonstrative expressions) would be difficult for the inferentialist. I wish to consider Rosenberg’s 
attempt at such an accommodation. 
 
According to Kripke’s causal theory of reference, ‘a’ in the mouth of S names a just in case there is a 
causal chain, of the appropriate sort, that links S’s pronunciation of ‘a’ to a. This chain may meander 
all over the landscape of S’s sociolinguistic community; but as long as it reaches a’s baptism, or 
perhaps a direct perception of a, ‘a’ refers to a.  
 
                                                
7 I have since been made aware of Rosenberg’s later work on proper names, in his Beyond Formalism: Naming and Necessity 
for Human Beings [BF]. I do not discuss this here, though I imagine that I should be inclined to make criticisms in its case 
similar to those I make in LRPN’s case.  
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Rosenberg comments thus on Kripke’s theory: 
The gist of the Causal Theory is that proper names don’t have senses. The Causal Theory is 
essentially relational. The job of proper names (and rigid designators generally) is to provide 
a set of anchorage points for the web of belief, tethering the linguistic order to the non-
linguistic by causal chains. What a proper name has is a referent, not a sense, and its link 
with that referent is not semantic, proceeding indirectly through sense (in the form of 
descriptive content)… but is rather intended to be a direct, naturalistic, causal hookup. 
[LRPN §27] 
 
Reference is, at least on the Kripkean picture, not, according to Rosenberg, a semantic relation, but a 
“naturalistic, causal hookup”. To accommodate proper names within a Sellarsian picture of 
intentionality is to give a theory of their inferential role: there is no room, within such a picture, for a 
“naturalistic, causal hookup”, since such a thing does not count as intentional. What is to be done 
instead? 
 
Rosenberg’s suggestion is that we look to the phenomena of intersentential and intercontextual anaphora. 
(Anaphora also plays an essential role in Brandom’s MIE and subsequent work.) Within a context, 
reference is controlled by anaphoric chains, as may be illustrated by the following example [adapted 
from LRPN §28]. 
Gertrude was sitting under a tree. Along came a goat. She offered it a sherry. The goat took 
it from her and climbed the tree. She watched it sip the sherry. 
 
In this story, there are four intersentential anaphoric chains: 
 
 Gertrude…. she …. her …. she 
 A tree …. the tree 
 A goat…. it1…. the goat …. it3 
 A sherry…. it3 …. a sherry 
 
Whenever we come across a noun phrase and wonder what is being talked about, we may look to 
the phrase’s antecedent. There are also intercontextual anaphoric chains—that is, chains that hold 
between expressions across contexts. Where there are such chains we may think of contexts as 
“fused” to form a single larger context. 
 
I have said that, whenever we come across a noun phrase, we may, to answer the question what it is 
being used to talk about, locate its antecedent. But how do we answer the question what its 
antecedent is being used to talk about? What happens when we reach the head of an anaphoric 
chain—when we reach ‘Gertrude’? Kripke’s picture tells us that we must look for a certain causal 
 32 
transaction: that we must search for an extralinguistic causal chain that leads to a person (here, 
Gertrude). If there is no such appropriate causal transaction, then ‘Gertrude’ does not name anyone 
or anything. The story in question is a mere story, so only story-relative identification, as Strawson puts it, 
of the person referred to by ‘she’, ‘her’, and ‘she’ is possible. [I p. 18]  
 
Charles Chastain [R&C] proposes a variation on Kripke’s story. Anaphoric chains begin, Chastain 
suggests, with perceptual contexts. There must, to be sure, be an appropriate causal connection between 
a person’s perceptual content—where “perceptual content” is here construed as determined by what 
a subject seems to see, hear, feel, and so on—and an object, in order for such a perceptual context to 
count as the head of an anaphoric chain. A perceptual content contains a singular element that may or 
may not refer an object in the world; and when the causal connection in question obtains, it refers. 
When not, it doesn’t.  
 
But, interestingly, Chastain goes on to liberalize (in one sense) Kripke’s requirements so that there 
need be no essential causal element in the story. In effect, any state that counts as having knowledge 
of an object is sufficient for the kind of relation one must bear to an object in order to refer to it 
directly (and in order to place the pertinent referring expression at the head of an anaphoric chain). 
Here the causal relation in which one stands to an object of one’s perception is not considered as 
having any epistemic significance. Chastain, quoted in LRPN: 
If it must be pigeonholed it would be more accurate to call [CC’s] theory an ‘epistemic’ 
theory; what gives is a ‘causal’ flavor is the incidental fact that the processes of inter-
contextual translation and the formation of referential chains are intelligible to most people 
only on a causal analysis, as are perception and memory; but that is not essential to the 
theory. [R&C 256] 
 
Let us appropriate Chastain’s idea that the relation of reference that holds between the singular 
term—we omit consideration of other varieties of noun phrase—at the head of an anaphoric chain, 
and an object in the world to which it refers, depends on knowledge of the object. There now looms 
the question what knowledge of an object amounts to. I shall suggest that it is always necessary, to 
have knowledge of an object, to stand in a certain relation to the object that involves demonstrative 
identification. That is, I must be able to identify the object as this object; or I must be able to 
discriminate it from all other objects by description, where the description in question is an impure 
definite description: that is, a definite description, in Russell’s sense, that contains some indexical or 
demonstrative element essentially, so that it is not purely descriptive. But demonstrative 
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identification does, I submit, require that a certain causal transaction take place (though this is only a 
necessary and not a sufficient condition of demonstrative identification). I thus depart from 
Chastain in insisting that referential chains and perception must be understood on a causal (though 
not a merely causal) analysis. But I shall return to this point later. 
 
Thus far we have still said nothing about the inferential role of names, an account of which it is 
Rosenberg’s aim to develop. He suggests combining Chastain’s epistemological variation on 
Kripke’s causal theme with the Sellarsian epistemology Rosenberg’s schematic sketch of which I 
quoted near the end of the last section. This was an epistemology according to which epistemic 
appraisal had to be systemic and internalistic. To think otherwise, on this view, is to fall into the 
Myth of the Given. But of course there must be a sense, even on the Sellarsian line, in which our 
epistemic appraisal must answer to the world. For otherwise it is a sheer coherentism, and “we are 
left with a merely aesthetic choice among a, possibly infinite, number of equally coherent 
representational schemes” [LRPN §36]. We have returned to the question that was never resolved  
in the previous section. What is the epistemic status of observations, according to Rosenberg? What 
is their role in systemic, internalistic epistemic appraisal? 
 
Sellars calls observations the causal result of language-entries. These observations are conceptual 
representings that are elicited by a non-conceptual state of a perceiver, a state constituted by the 
speaker’s being in a causal relation with some object. The elicitation cannot have epistemic import, 
because no justification can be derived from a non-conceptual state. So the relationship between 
such a conceptual representing—say, this is a cat before me—and an object—in this case, the cat—is 
not, all by itself, a justificatory relationship. But such conceptual representings still occupy a 
distinctive position in Sellarsian epistemology. They are, as Rosenberg puts it, the system’s raison 
d’être: a representational system answers to them. That is, they are not dispensable. If I find myself 
with the conceptual representing this is a cat before me, and this is inconsistent with something else I 
believe, I cannot, ordinarily, choose to discard my conceptual representing. I must rather readjust 
bits of my language-cum-theory that are closer to the interior. This, then, is how Sellars avoids a 
sheer coherentism. It is not arbitrary how the system is adjusted so that it coheres. It must be 
adjusted in a certain way: and this way consists, in part, in preserving the conceptual representings 
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that result (causally) from language-entries. It is in this way that Sellars and Rosenberg manage to 
achieve some degree of answerability to the world.8 
 
But why should conceptual representings like this is a cat before me have this special status? Why do I 
count as knowing that this is a cat before me when I have this representing? A different, but related 
question: what gives me reason to believe the content in question? Sellars’s answer is that I have reason 
to believe that this is a cat before me because (i) there is a reliable belief-forming mechanism involving 
the causal relation that obtains between my conceptual representing and the cat, and (ii) I know that 
there is such a mechanism [EPM]. It is important to note that this is a second-order account of my 
reason for belief in this case. That is, I have reason to believe that this is a cat before me only because I 
know that the mechanism that produces my conceptual representings is reliable. I could have no 
reason for my first-order perceptual belief unless I knew something about my beliefs generally, and 
how they are produced.  
 
This explains, incidentally, why and in what sense observationality as such is epistemically 
unimportant for the Sellarsian. For our use of observational vocabulary is essentially attached to the 
way in which we observe: that is, the way in which our sensory consciousness is shaped. It matters 
that I see the cat, that it is presented visually; otherwise, ‘cat’ is not a bit of observational vocabulary. But 
that I see a cat, in a visual sense, is epistemically irrelevant to the Sellarsian. My knowing that this is a 
cat before me for Sellars is simply a matter of (i) my being reliably disposed to utter ‘this is a cat before 
me’ in the presence of cats (and not otherwise, and with whatever other necessary qualifications); 
and (ii) my knowing that I am thus reliably disposed. I might just as well be in the same situation 
with respect to the representing this is a mu-meson before me. That is, no vocabulary is epistemically 
observational, in this sense, though it might be causally observational in the sense that it is causally 
associated with sensory events. 
 
Let us return to the case of proper names. Recall that, with respect to the various referring and 
denoting expressions in our story about Gertrude and the goat, we could ask who they referred to, 
                                                
8 This is a point relative to which Rosenberg makes the distinction between empirical science and other species of 
inquiry: the moral and political, for example. The former has no dealings in reflective equilibrium, whereas the latter does. 
Reflective equilibrium is a methodology according to which the “data” are themselves dispensable for the sake of the 
“theory”; whereas in science, the data—conceptual representings that are the causal effect of language-entries—are not 
dispensable. Theory must be modified to accord with them. [LAEP] Such themes are also the topic of C. F. Delaney’s 
[BPES]. 
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or denoted; and could respond ‘Gertrude’, or ‘the goat’, or ‘the tree’—we could respond, that is, 
with the first element in the anaphoric chain. We then considered that, if our identification of the 
designatum was not to be merely story-relative, we should have to identify the designatum by 
demonstration.  
 
This is precisely what Rosenberg denies. He believes, that is, that all identification is story-relative; 
and, moreover, that story-relative identification is enough for objective reference. [LRPN §37] The 
story in question is the world story. But identification in the world-story is not arbitrary, because 
conceptual representings that are the causal result of language entries cannot be discarded. 
Objectivity is secured by the modified Sellarsian reliabilism which I discussed briefly above.  
 
I shall not summarize the details of Rosenberg’s account; the features that are relevant for my 
purposes have, I think, been adequately exposed. It is, of course, not the only theory of proper 
names in the Sellarsian spirit. But its account of the semantics of names gives them immediate 
representation in the realm of the epistemic, because it is a robustly internalist account of names. This 
is because intersentential and intercontextual anaphora can be handled inferentially; and story-
relative identification—and, in particular, identification relative to the world-story—consists merely 
in locating the head of an anaphoric chain by following its links. 
 
Recall that Sellars’s was a distinctively second-order account of reasons for perceptual belief. That is, I 
only have reason to hold the first-order belief that this is a cat before me because I hold the second-
order belief that my first-order beliefs are elicited by a reliable mechanism. So my conceptual 
representing with the content that this is a cat before me is not itself a reason to hold the belief in 
question. 
 
It is time to introduce a new character to our philosophical story. Bill Brewer argues, in my view 
convincingly, that conceptual representings must be reasons for belief [PR, esp. pp. 49-91]. Brewer 
seeks to establish that such representings could not have content if they did not provide reasons for 
belief. His argument is detailed, and I can do no more than gesture at its outlines here and say that I 
find it convincing. Here is the basic presentation of the “Switching Argument”: 
Consider…a person, S, who believes that p, where this is supposed to be an empirical belief, 
about how things are in the mind-independent world around her. Since their relations with 
certain perceptual experiences play an essential role in the determination of the contents of 
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empirical beliefs, there is a range of alternative such beliefs—beliefs which she might have 
had instead—whose difference in content with her actual belief that p would have been due 
entirely to their standing in the relevant relations with different perceptual experiences. 
Suppose that the belief that q is one of these. […] She does not believe that q. Had her 
perceptual experiences been appropriately different, though, her position would have been 
precisely the reverse: she would have believed that q, and not believed that p. Yet the 
relevant content-determining relations between experiences and beliefs are not reason-giving 
relations. So S’s actual perceptual experiences give her no more reason to believe that p than 
to believe that q. Thus, she has, and could have, no reason whatsoever to believe p rather 
than q, or vice versa. […] So she does not really understand them as alternatives. Believing that p 
and believing that q are identical for her. […] Thus, if the relevant relations between 
experiences and beliefs are not reason-giving relations, then they contribute nothing to the 
determination of specific worldly truth-conditions for empirical beliefs. [PR pp. 50-51] 
 
We may recast the argument slightly. Suppose that S has a conceptual-perceptual representing with 
the content that-p. The question is whether her having this representing is a reason for her to believe 
that-p. We may contrast this representing with the representing with the content that-q, incompatible 
with that-p. If the representing gives S no reason whatsoever to believe that-p, and if we can say 
further that S could have no reason to believe that-p, rather than that-q, given the assumption that the 
representing gives S no reason whatsoever to believe that-p, then we may say that p and q are 
identical for S. But this contradicts our initial assumption, according to which p and q are different 
and, indeed, incompatible contents. So S’s having a conceptual-perceptual representing with the 
content that-p is indeed a reason for her to believe that-p. 
 
But what this argument does not establish is that my conceptual representings must themselves be 
reasons for belief, independently of a second-order account of perceptual knowledge of the kind 
that Sellars advances. For it might be that my reason to believe that p rather than that q is not 
derived solely from my conceptual representing with content p but rather with this representing in 
conjunction with my knowledge that it has been produced by a reliable mechanism.  
 
That this last is not the case Brewer argues later in his book. Indeed, he tackles Sellars head-on. But I 
do not think that his argument here succeeds, and this is precisely because Sellars’s account differs in 
an important respect from other second-order accounts of perceptual knowledge. Brewer insists, in 
the conclusion to the chapter in which he discusses Sellars, that 
second-order accounts of the truth of [the thesis that perceptual experiences provide reasons 
for empirical beliefs] are…unacceptable. These attempt to satisfy the recognition 
requirement upon the provision by perceptual experiences of reasons for empirical beliefs by 
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the subject’s second-order reflection upon the credentials of her first-order method of belief 
acquisition, where the first and second orders are independent in the following sense: she 
might equally have acquired the same belief by just the same first-order method yet not have 
had the second-order knowledge in question. [P&R p. 145] 
 
But this remark—which is supposed to summarize the case against second-order accounts of 
perceptual knowledge in general—is inapplicable in the case of Sellars’s account, because he does not 
hold that the first and second orders are independent in the relevant sense. Sellars insists that the 
first-order belief has its content—indeed, is a belief at all!—only in virtue of the subject’s second-
order knowledge to the effect that the first-order belief was elicited by a reliable mechanism. No 
subject could, according to Sellars, acquire any beliefs unless she had the second-order knowledge in 
question.  
 
That this is true of Sellars’s account is brought out very clearly in Brewer’s antecedent discussion 
(which makes it all the more puzzling that it goes unmentioned in his conclusion to the chapter). In 
particular, Brewer quotes the following passage from EPM, in which Sellars considers and responds 
to an objection to his modified reliabilism. 
36. […] 
It might be thought that there is an obvious regress in the view we are examining. Does it 
not tell us that observational knowledge at time t presupposes knowledge of the form X is a 
reliable symptom of Y, which presupposes prior observational knowledge, which presupposes 
other knowledge of the form X is a reliable symptom of Y, which presupposes still other, and 
prior, observational knowledge, and so on? This charge, however, rests on too simple, indeed 
a radically mistaken, conception of what one is saying of Jones when one says that he knows 
that-p. It is not just that the objection supposes that knowing is an episode; for clearly there 
are episodes which we can correctly characterize as knowings, in particular, observings. The 
essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not 
giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space 
of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.  
 
37. Thus, all that the view I am defending requires is that no tokening by S now of ‘This is 
green’ is to count as ‘expressing observational knowledge’ unless it is also correct to say of S 
that he now knows the appropriate fact of the form X is a reliable symptom of Y, namely that 
(and again I oversimplify) utterances of ‘This is green’ are reliable indicators of the presence 
of green objects in standard conditions of perception. And while the correctness of this 
statement about Jones requires that Jones could now cite prior particular facts as evidence for 
the idea that these utterances are reliable indicators, it requires only that it is correct to say 
that Jones now knows, thus remembers, that these particular facts did obtain. It does not 
require that it be correct to say that at the time these facts did obtain he then knew them to 
obtain. And the regress disappears.  
 Thus, while Jones’s ability to give inductive reasons today is built on a long history of 
acquiring and manifesting verbal habits in perceptual situations, and, in particular, the 
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occurrence of verbal episodes, e.g. ‘This is green’, which is superficially like those which 
are later properly said to express observational knowledge, it does not require that any 
episode in this prior time be characterizable as expressing knowledge. [emphatic boldface 
mine] 
 
If Sellars held that first-order and second-order knowledge were independent in the sense that a 
subject might hold a first-order belief, elicited by a reliable mechanism, and yet not have first-order 
knowledge—which requires second-order knowledge of the reliable mechanism, and so on—then 
why would he observe that Jones’s “verbal episodes” antecedent to his acquisition of such second-
order knowledge are merely “superficially like those which are later properly said to express 
observational knowledge”? What Sellars is saying here is that these are mere verbal episodes that are 
bereft of conceptual content. This reading squares with his views on linguistic and conceptual 
development, according to which we begin to learn language by developing dispositions to respond 
to stimuli in certain ways, as taught us by our elders, and only later become concept-mongers. For 
Sellars is clear that he believes that one cannot have one concept without having them all. Learning 
to respond to green things with verbal episodes ‘this is green’ is not sufficient for having conceptual 
representings as of green things. This happens only at a late stage in linguistic development.  
 
My reading of Sellars is confirmed by a footnote to §37: 
My thought was that one can have direct (non-inferential) knowledge of a past fact which 
one did not or even (as in the case envisaged) could not conceptualize at the time it was 
present. [EPM §37 fn.]9 
 
Before Jones acquires second-order knowledge of the reliability of the mechanism in question, he 
cannot even conceptualize the fact. Since the representing in question—the thought that is equivalent 
in content to the utterance ‘this is green’—is a conceptual representing, it follows that Jones does not, 
antecedent to his acquisition of this second-order knowledge, have this thought. 
 
Brewer’s earlier, convincing argument (the crude outline of which I gave above) against the view that 
representings do not serve as reasons for empirical belief cannot be deployed to refute Sellars’s view. 
For it may serve only as a refutation of a second-order account of perceptual knowledge according 
to which a subject may have conceptual representings and yet no first-order knowledge, because she 
lacks second-order knowledge to the effect that her conceptual representings are elicited by a reliable 
                                                
9 My reading is again confirmed by that of deVries and Triplett, KMG, Chapter 8. 
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mechanism. But, as we have seen, Sellars would deny that a subject could have conceptual 
representings at all without such second-order knowledge.  
 
This is why Brewer constructs an entirely different argument against the Sellarsian view. Various 
conditions must be met for Jones to come to the conclusion that his past utterances of ‘this is green’ 
were reliable symptoms of green things. In particular, it must be a premise of his reasoning that he 
made the utterances in question. But he did not know anything when he was making them; so, in 
particular, he did not know then that he was making them, nor that there was anything green before 
him. Could he nonetheless know now that he was making them then, and that there was then 
something green before him? Brewer: 
A…difficulty for Sellars concerns his suggestion that learning the language of physical 
objects in space and time provides Jones with memory-based knowledge that his earlier 
utterances were true statements about the condition of external things when they were made. 
It is one thing to admit, as he puts in a footnote to the passage quoted above [TP: in this 
paper too], ‘that one can have direct (non-inferential) knowledge of a past fact which one did 
not or even…could not conceptualize at the time it was present’ ([EPM], p. 169). It is quite 
another thing to hold that this is possible even if there is no sense whatsoever in which such 
a fact was actually present to the subject at the earlier time. [P&R, p. 138] 
 
In other words, his memory at some time t of what was the case at an earlier time t0 is 
supposed radically to depend upon his conceptual sophistication at t in the following sense. 
He might have known absolutely nothing at t0, about the way things then were in the world 
around him, or, indeed, about anything else; yet there might nevertheless be a later t1 at 
which he is able directly (non-inferentially) to remember that there was a green object in 
front of him at t0. [P&R, p. 139] 
 
Brewer is, I believe, correct in insisting that this is an implication of Sellars’s view. But I do not 
believe that this is a problem. There are many who believe that intentional beings must have 
concepts of belief and knowledge—that is, that they must be capable of entertaining second-order 
content even to entertain first-order content. Anyone who believes this will at some stage be faced 
with a seemingly paradoxical case analogous to that with which, according to Brewer, Sellars is faced 
here. Questions about what “comes first”—presumably in the order of being—are not, in any case, 
my concern here.  
 
Now, there is one obvious way in which Jones could come to know, at time t1, what utterances he 
made at t0, antecedent to his attaining unto the space of reasons. He could ask someone else, 
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someone who was in the space of reasons when he was engaging in all that conceptually-empty 
verbal behavior. He could, for example, ask his mother.  
 
Brewer’s discussion does not, then, convince me to abandon Sellars’s epistemology. But there is 
something else that does. And it amounts to this: Jones’s asking his mother is just not enough. That 
is to say that Sellars’s notion of an observation—one whose epistemic status is that of a conceptual 
representing that, as I, the subject, know, is elicited by a reliable mechanism—is not, pace Rosenberg, 
good enough to secure objectivity. 
 
We see why this is when we ask how I am to know that the mechanism in question is reliable. For I 
cannot, as Rosenberg insists, take a sideways-on view of my epistemic commerce with the world. If I 
have reason to believe that the mechanism is reliable, I must have such reason in virtue of the 
position in which I stand within horizontal intentionality, within the space of reasons, as the 
Sellarsian has circumscribed it. 
 
Brandom claims that such reason is indeed available within horizontal intentionality:10 
If a suitable story is told about the constitutive inferential engagement of these 
noninferentially elicited judgments with other judgments, then their status as denizens of the 
space of reasons and products of spontaneity is secured. … If a suitable story is told about 
how they are rationally criticizable by those who key their correctness to their 
correspondence to the facts reported, and about their entitlement to the reliability of the 
noninferential process that elicits them, then rational constraint by how things actually are is 
secured. [PRC p. 372] 
 
What sort of story does Brandom think suitable to this task? His own: 
 
What I want to claim… is that if we recognize that giving and asking for reasons is a 
constellation of essentially social practices, and that the commitments and entitlements those 
practices involve are accordingly essentially social statuses, we will be in a position to 
understand factive locutions such as knowledge and warrantive locutions such as reliable as 
attributing standings in the space of reasons. [KSASR pp. 902-3] 
 
Brandom considers the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. Justification and belief are 
obvious enough to capture in his social-perspectival horizontal epistemology. Attributing 
                                                
10 I do not know whether Brandom’s story is amenable to Sellars. (Obviously, Brandom thinks so.) But I cannot find a 
place where Sellars addresses this question directly, and I cannot think of how he can answer the challenge in any way 
that differs significantly from Brandom’s. (This is not, of course, to say that there is no such way!) 
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justification is attributing an entitlement; and attributing belief is attributing a commitment. But what 
of truth?  
Taking [someone else’s belief] to be true is not a matter of attributing a commitment, but of 
undertaking one—endorsing the claim oneself. 
[…] 
Thinking of things this way, assessing someone as having successfully achieved the status or 
standing of a knower involves adopting three different attitudes: attributing a commitment, 
attributing an entitlement, and undertaking a commitment. … Knowledge is intelligible as a 
standing in the space of reasons, because and insofar as it is intelligible as a status one can be 
taken to achieve in the game of giving and asking for reasons. But it is essentially a social 
status… [KSASR p. 904] 
 
On this view, objectivity amounts to nothing over and above intersubjectivity. One cannot achieve 
an objective take on reality on one’s own; but with the agreement of various different perspectives, 
one can, for such agreement is objectivity itself. This is a consequence not only of social-perspectival 
pictures of intersubjectivity. It is also a feature of pictures that include not multiple subjects standing 
before one object, but rather a single subject standing before an object at different times. It is 
doubtless true that both of these varieties of triangulation are necessary for the development of a 
conception of objectivity. But this kind of triangulated intersubjectivity is, I insist, not yet 
objectivity.11  
 
Moreover, it will not do to say that, as it happens, we represent things as they are. That is, it will not 
do to say that, because our linguistics system is “causally informed” by the world, it will, inevitably, 
turn out to resemble the world, though we are not in direct epistemic contact with it. I object to 
such doctrines not because I am afraid that we might not, after all, resemble the world, if they are 
correct, but rather because they do not make sense of the nature of content. Content is not shaped in 
such a way that it simply happens to resemble what it is purported to represent. When something (a 
sentence, say) has content, it is about something. That is, it does not simply resemble something. For 
even if an inferential system resembles the world perfectly, it is yet shrouded in darkness. It is not 
about the world; it merely looks like it. 
 
Intersubjectivity is not enough with respect to matters of fact just as it is not enough with respect to 
matters of meaning. We may ask, of the subject, whether her belief is true, whether the world is as 
                                                
11 Brandom claims to secure objectivity in chapter 8 of Making It Explicit [MIE]. I do not have the space to discuss this 
here, but in my view what he has secured in this chapter is not empirical objectivity, but merely a discourse’s pretension 
to objectivity.  
 42 
she represents it. And clearly the world is not simply however she represents it. There is a distinction 
between what she happens to think, or say, and what it would be right to think, or say. If anything she 
happens to think, or say, is right, then there is, as Wittgenstein taught us, no question of right at all. 
 
Wittgenstein taught us this lesson in a different connection. His concern was not belief about the 
world but understanding and use of language. It cannot be that however I use a certain word is 
correct, simply in virtue of my using it that way. For if we say this, we lose our grip on the notion of 
correctness, thus on the notion of semantic objectivity. Kripke is famous for having suggested that 
Wittgenstein thought that semantic correctness should be construed relative to a community, so that 
however the community uses an expression is the correct use of the expression. [WRPL, p. 89]  But 
this does not help. For we have once again lost our grip on correctness, on the notion of semantic 
objectivity. As for the individual, so for the community: if whatever it does is right, we cannot talk 
about right.12 
 
Let us return to our concern: belief about the world. Imagine humanity—the largest community in 
question here—with its face turned upon a cat. Everyone is in supreme intersubjective agreement 
that this is a cat before us. The question is what difference it makes that the cat is, in fact, there. My 
contention is that it makes all the difference in the world. For only if the cat is there do we have the 
cat in view. 
 
And this difference is, I insist, an epistemic difference. It makes a difference to our epistemic standing 
whether there is a cat there or not. This question—whether the cat is there or not—is posed under 
the assumption that humanity has done all its epistemic homework, has exploited all its reliable 
mechanisms—is, as McDowell puts it, doxastically blameless. But if it is true that this is a cat before us, 
then we are more than doxastically blameless. We occupy an entirely different epistemic standing, 
because we are in direct epistemic commerce with a bit of the world.13  
 
                                                
12 This is brought out in McDowell’s WFR. 
13 What is going on when one is doxastically blameless, though there is in fact no cat before one? What kind of content 
does one’s putative perceptual-conceptual representing have? The question of what happens when things go wrong with 
respect to demonstrative content is a difficult one. I do not have a satisfactory answer here. Of course, there is some 
content. (Indeed, some of the representing may even be veridical, even if not all of it is.) But I am not sure precisely 
what this content amounts to. Here is at least something: the speaker is not to be blamed for drawing certain inferences, 
and these are precisely those inferences that she would be entitled to draw were her experience veridical. I am not sure 
what we want to say about how this bears on questions about the state of her “psychological economy”. 
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What I am insisting on here is the disjunctive conception of experience.14 Either I am having a 
veridical experience of this cat, or there is no cat. I am in a different epistemic state depending on 
which disjunct is true. The notion of observation must, I submit, be understood according to this 
conception. Unless we adopt the disjunctive conception of experience—and, in particular, if we try 
to preserve objectivity by some other means, through intersubjectivity, say—we lose our grip on the 
notion of objectivity, on the idea that our experience has objective purport. And this is, quite simply, 
not a philosophical option. This is a consideration to which McDowell appeals in his insistence on 
the disjunctive conception of experience, which is part of his resistance to what he calls the 
interiorization of the space of reasons that Brandom’s view implicates. [KI, KIR] Recall that I sounded a 
skeptical note about whether the resources were available, in the space of reasons as the Sellarsian 
had circumscribed it, to know that the mechanism eliciting conceptual representings was reliable. I 
did not intend that the resources were not available in the space of reasons correctly circumscribed. 
This is a space in which there is more to one’s standing than having done one’s epistemic 
homework. The world has a role to play as well. For even if I am as doxastically blameless as I can 
be, the world needs to coöperate for me to have it in view.  
 
Just as my conceptual representings are epistemically distinguished simply in virtue of being 
veridical, so they are intentionally distinguished. (Indeed, this is their being epistemically 
distinguished.) The content of our conceptual experiencing—the content this is a cat before me—
depends upon direct epistemic commerce with the world. We should not, if there were no cat there, 
be having precisely this conceptual experiencing. Correlatively, the experience contains singular 
demonstrative content. To put it another way, the semantic value (extension) of ‘this’, in the pronounced 
equivalent of the conceptual experiencing in question, is the cat. If there were no cat, ‘this’ would 
have no value. The sentence would not even be false. It makes a difference to what the sentence 
means whether or not it is true, whether or not we see that the world is a certain way. This is a clear 
expression of the idea that meaning has an empirical ground. What sentences mean depends, in this 
very straightforward sense, on how things are in reality, and on our seeing that they are that way. 
Considerations like these may be taken as another argument for the disjunctive conception of 
experience. Once we understand the nature of demonstrative reference, we see that, if we are not to 
pull the epistemic apart from the intentional, we must adopt disjunctivism. For if the very content of 
                                                
14 I should not be taken to be committed to any theses that go strictly beyond what I associate explicitly in this section 
with the “disjunctive conception of experience”, however the expression ‘disjunctivism’ may be used by authors other 
than McDowell. 
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an experiencing is different depending on whether there is a cat before me or not, then I am 
entertaining different content, depending on whether there is a cat before me or not; and if I am 
entertaining entirely different content, I must be in a different epistemic state. For I cannot be in 
precisely the same epistemic state with respect to two different pieces of content.  
 
And this is why we may say, with Brewer, that perceptual experiences themselves provide reasons 
for belief. For perceptual experience, where we understand experience as, necessarily, experience of 
something, is experience with singular demonstrative content. But there would be no such content 
unless the experience was veridical (for if there is no cat, ‘this’ has no value). So that I am having a 
perceptual experience with the content this is a cat before me gives me reason to believe that this is a cat 
before me. And, more than this, it allows me to know that this is a cat before me, simply by having a 
perceptual experience of the very cat in question.  
 
I thus adopt Brewer’s thesis as the epistemological alternative to the Sellarsian’s modified reliabilism, 
which I rejected above on the ground that it did not allow us to preserve a robust conception of 
objectivity. The Sellarsian view was that I am entitled to believe the content of my conceptual 
experiencing that this is a cat before me in virtue of my knowing that the experiencing was elicited by a 
reliable mechanism; and, moreover, that such second-order knowledge is necessary for my having 
this conceptual experiencing at all. I claim, with Brewer, that the conceptual experience itself gives me 
reason to believe its content, simply because it would not have the singular demonstrative content 
that it does have unless it were veridical.  
 
Of course, I do believe that the kind of triangulation that is required to achieve intersubjective 
agreement (or intertemporal intrasubjective agreement, in the other case I considered) is a necessary 
condition of attaining unto the space of reasons. And once a subject has attained unto the space of 
reasons, she need make no reference to such intersubjective agreement in justifying her perceptual 
beliefs. I am here following the lead of McDowell: 
 
A rational animal could not have acquired the conceptual capacities in the possession of 
which its rationality consists except by being initiated into a social practice. But as I see 
things, the capacities transform their possessor into an individual who can achieve standings 
in the space of entitlements by her own efforts. [KIR p.287] 
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I have suggested that the disjunctive conception of experience is correlative with the correct account 
of singular demonstrative content. That is to say that a subject may entertain a singular 
demonstrative content only if she stands in an epistemic relationship with an object in the world, 
even apart from her having done her epistemic homework; and that her standing in this epistemic 
relationship is only possible if she may demonstratively identify the object in question. It is worth 
considering a different theoretical expression of the same view: a liberalized Russellian doctrine of 
acquaintance. Brewer, whose view I have adopted, puts things in the following way. The structure of 
a classic Russellian position is the following: 
(A) Reference is possible only to objects about which a person is in a position to express 
non-inferential knowledge. 
(B) The only objects about which a person is ever in a position to express non-inferential 
knowledge are sense-data. 
(C) Therefore, the only objects to which reference is possible are sense-data.  
[P&R pp. 252-3, letters altered] 
 
The “Standard Reaction”, as Brewer calls it, is to deny (A) and endorse (B), with the consequence 
that a subject does not have non-inferential knowledge about physical objects in her environment 
but can nonetheless refer to such objects. Brewer’s alternative reaction, which I have adopted, is to 
endorse (A) and deny (B): a subject does have non-inferential knowledge about physical objects in her 
environment, and so can refer to them. (One might have also put it the other way round.)  
 
Russell’s Principle of Acquaintance is, roughly, that one must be acquainted with an object in order 
to refer to it. I claim, with Brewer, that to be acquainted with an object is to have the capacity 
demonstratively to identify it, to locate it in space. For a subject to entertain a singular demonstrative 
content, she must be thus acquainted with an object.15 Of course, a subject may entertain a singular 
content, analogous with a proper name, even if she has not been acquainted with the object, as long 
as her entertaining of this content is suitably linked—anaphorically, say—with another’s entertaining 
of the same content, such that this other is acquainted with the object.   
 
Let us take stock of where we are. Observations are direct epistemic takes on the world, where what 
this means is that they should be understood according to the disjunctive conception of experience: 
                                                
15 “Could we not refer to Neptune, before we were acquainted to it, when we fixed the reference of ‘Neptune’ with the 
description ‘what causes the perturbations of Uranus’?” Perhaps we could. I shall shortly say that demonstrative 
identification is direct location; and perhaps Neptune might have been located, even if roughly, in space and time, before 
it was located more precisely.  
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they have their content only if they are, in fact, observations, only if they contain singular 
demonstrative content whose correspondence with a bit of the world is a necessary condition of 
their being content at all. For a subject to entertain a singular demonstrative content—the kind that 
is present in every direct epistemic take on the world—she must be in a position demonstratively to 
identify the semantic value (extension) in question, or, perhaps, to be appropriately related to some 
other member of her sociolinguistic community who has this capacity. And demonstratively 
identifying an extension requires having it in view—again, in accordance with the disjunctive 
conception of experience. There are many reasons for adopting this view. I have gestured at the two 
that I find most convincing. The first is that we must adopt the disjunctive conception of experience 
if we are not to lose our grip on the notion of objectivity. The second is that disjunctivism is the 
right epistemology to pair with the correct account of demonstrative reference.16 
 
Thus far I have discussed names and demonstratives. What of predicates? And what of the 
distinction between observational and theoretical vocabulary that we saw in section III?  
 
Observational vocabulary is simply vocabulary that a subject is entitled to use in a demonstrative 
expression. That is, observational vocabulary is vocabulary that can be combined with ‘this’, and its 
variants, to yield an expression with demonstrative content.17 Such an expression has demonstrative 
content only if the speaker wielding it stands in a certain epistemic relation to one or more objects to 
which she is demonstrating. This requires that she be able to identify these objects demonstratively.  
What is required to identify objects demonstratively? Following Strawson, Brewer, and doubtless 
others, I say that demonstrative identification is identification in space and time. Demonstratively to 
                                                
16 These considerations are related; and there are many others that I shall not discuss here but that have received 
extensive treatment in the literature. I was led to take such considerations seriously primarily by the work of McDowell 
and Brewer, as cited elsewhere in this section. I shall not here address the question why we need demonstrative 
reference—and why, in particular, identification by pure description would not do instead. Brewer’s argument is the 
same as Strawson’s: it is from the epistemic possibility of massive reduplication. The idea is, roughly, that it is always an 
epistemic possibility for me that what I think of as my world is really only a single copy in a series of qualitatively 
identical scenarios. So it is always an epistemic possibility that the definite description fails to denote, because it fails to 
satisfy the uniqueness condition. Though this is a venerable philosophical argument, I do not think that it really explains 
why demonstrative reference is so important. (Besides this, it has the feel of philosophy as science fiction—which I find 
distasteful.) I think that the key to explaining the need for reference lies in the insight—of Strawson and Brewer, for 
example—that demonstratively to identify is to locate in space. Unless one believes in absolute space, there is no way to 
impose a coördinate system of the kind that would be required to achieve successful denotation by description without 
doing it “egocentrically”—that is, without taking oneself, or some point to which one pointed, as the origin of the 
system. But there are other considerations that shore up the doctrine of the necessity of reference. One of these will 
feature in section VI.   
17 I consider only singular reference here; plural reference would take me too far afield. 
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identify is, according to Strawson, directly to locate. [I p. 19] It follows that observational vocabulary is 
vocabulary that can be combined with a ‘this’ to yield an expression whose value is a particular that a 
subject can locate directly. Merely theoretical vocabulary is vocabulary that is not like that. 
 
There is a separate question what is to count as observational vocabulary. And it would seem that 
vocabulary that was once merely theoretical might now be also observational. Consider the case of 
‘cell membrane’. I may locate a cell membrane by observing it through a microscope. The real test of 
my having located it is my attempt to penetrate it with a needle. If I manage to do that, and to see 
that I have done it, then I have surely located the thing successfully. Is ‘electron’ a bit of 
observational vocabulary? Ian Hacking has insisted that we countenance electrons in our ontology, 
since we can spray them. [R&I p. 23] It is open to question whether we can narrow down the 
possibilities with respect to an electron’s location to the extent required demonstratively to identify 
it. But perhaps we can, in certain conditions—that we can spray electrons certainly suggests as 
much. (Demonstrative identification of the cell membrane also requires that special conditions 
obtain. In particular, one needs an electron microscope.)  
 
I have urged that we make room for direct epistemic takes on the world. How have I not run into 
the Myth of the Given? Sellars: 
…it is clear that if observation reports are construed as actions, if their correctness is 
interpreted as the correctness of an action, and if the authority of an observation report is 
construed as the fact that making it is ‘following a rule’ in the proper sense of this phrase, 
then we are face to face with givenness in its most straightforward form. For these 
stipulations commit one to the idea that the authority of Konstatierungen rests on nonverbal 
episodes of awareness—awareness that something is the case, e.g., that this is green—which 
nonverbal episodes have an intrinsic authority which the verbal performances (the 
Konstatierungen) properly performed ‘express’. [EPM §34] 
 
What Sellars is imagining here is a view according to which we have a non-conceptual (dit non-
verbal) shaping of sensory consciousness to which we apply our concepts, such that if we apply 
them correctly, according to the rules that govern them, then we will have an authoritative 
observation report (Konstatierung). Making a true observation report is simply a matter of applying 
these concepts according to the rules.  
 
But of course this view is absurd, as Sellars points out. For what could count as following these rules 
of conceptual application? We may say 
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apply the concept ‘cat’ to a shaping of sensory consciousness just in case the latter has the 
following properties: … 
 
but how should we replace ‘…’ with qualities characterized in purely non-conceptual terms?  
 
I do not believe that there are rules for applying concepts to non-conceptual shapings of sensory 
consciousness. But this does not entail that shapings of sensory consciousness are not epistemically 
significant. For such shapings are, in the structure of their sensuality, conceptual. This is, of course, 
the master thought of McDowell’s MW. I do not, unfortunately, have the space to elucidate this 
thought, though I am inclined to think that one fruitful way of doing so would involve a careful 
interpretation of Kant’s Principles of the Understanding. I shall gesture at this way in the next 
section, but shall not attempt anything like an account.   
 
If the Myth of the Given is the myth that there is a way to apply concepts, in some sense correctly, 
to non-conceptual “material”, then I have avoided it (supposing, of course, that the master thought 
of MW is one that we can accept). 
 
Empirical predicates, I said in section III, were predicates whose content was embodied in principles 
of material inference, made explicit by a subjunctive rendering, whose adoption must be justified by 
instantial induction from observations. Having clarified the notion of observation that I 
recommend, I have completed the basic explication of this view. But what, then, is the representational 
role of empirical predicates? Certainly we often see that a certain object satisfies a certain empirical 
predicate, and that we can see this would seem to bear on the predicate’s meaning. The answer to this 
question will arise, in the next section, out of the Kantian theoretical expression that I give the view 
heretofore developed.  
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V. The Horizontal and the Vertical: a Kantian Reanimation 
 
I have in sections III and IV explored an account of the fundament of intentionality that 
appropriates elements of two pictures: the picture of intentionality as horizontal, on the one hand; 
and the picture of intentionality as vertical, on the other. The meaning of a predicate is constituted 
by, and embodied in, a principle of material inference that may be made explicit by a subjunctive 
rendering, as according to the picture of intentionality as horizontal. The principles of material 
inference that embody the content of empirical predicates must be such that their adoption is 
justified by induction, which I, following Rosenberg, understand as abduction from observations. 
Observations are conceptual representings with singular demonstrative content as construed by the 
disjunctive conception of experience. This last element of my view is a way of giving representation 
to the picture of intentionality as vertical. 
 
There are two questions that I consider especially pressing in light of my suggestion.  
 
I said in section IV that observations put us in direct epistemic contact with bits of the world, and 
that this was correlative with their having singular demonstrative content. Of course, we never see a 
sheer this, but always a this-such. And I have thus far treated perceptual representation and linguistic 
representation as of a piece. How do predicates, which have an inferential semantics, feature in 
shapings of sensory consciousness? This is one way to read the question of the projection of the 
horizontal onto the vertical, where we consider horizontal the inferential articulation of predicates, 
and vertical the shaping of sensory consciousness that is a logical precondition of a content’s being 
demonstrative. Of course, there is another way to read this question: when we ask how representational 
role is related to inferential role, we might be asking how extension is related to intension. This question 
is easier to answer. For the principles of material inference associated with empirical predicates tell 
us what should be included in the extension of those predicates. (As for singular demonstrative 
content, I have considered only its extensional aspect in any case, and have neglected its inferential 
role.) But it is the first question with which I am concerned in this section: that is, how do predicates 
receive representation in sensory perception? To put it another way: how are shapings of sensory 
consciousness themselves conceptualized? 
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There is, second, the question of how the content of a predicate could be constituted by an 
inductively justified principle of inference when the predicate in question had to be used in the 
formulation of the instances of the induction. That is, if the principle in question is 
 that x is F implies that x is G 
which is supposed to be partially constitutive of the meaning of ‘F’ and ‘G’, and if the adoption of 
this principle is justified in light of an induction whose instances are of the form 
 this F is G 
and if this last is equivalent to an observation—that is, a conceptual representing with singular 
demonstrative content, as construed by the disjunctive conception of experience—then surely ‘F’ 
and ‘G’ must be meaningful when I make these instantial observations, antecedent to adopting the 
principle in question—they must, for otherwise ‘this F is G’ is not an observation— but it is only upon 
the adoption of the principle that ‘F’ and ‘G’ have any content at all.  
 
I shall in this section answer the second question, and gesture to one way of answering the first. I 
hope also to clarify certain aspects of my view by dressing it in new clothes. In particular, this 
section is devoted to giving my view an alternative theoretical expression by locating its elements, or 
at least analogues thereof, in the theoretical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This ambition was 
inspired by the work of Béatrice Longuenesse, whose interpretation of the Transcendental Analytic 
of the Critique of Pure Reason seems to me to point up such analogues.  
 
That Kant was interested in induction and its relation to meaning is perhaps not obvious. But if we 
consider one aspect of the context in which he sought to justify the application of a priori 
concepts—i.e., the categories—we see why induction might be involved in his enterprise. Such 
categories were under attack by Hume, who insisted that, since they were not to be derived from 
experience—since, that is, they were not a posteriori—their application was unjustified. We are 
unjustified, according to the Humean, in regarding causal relations as inhering in the fabric of 
nature. Rather, putative causation should be understood in terms of the constant conjunction of 
appearances before the eyes of a thinking subject. Kant’s rejoinder was—to paint in very broad 
strokes indeed—that, pace Hume, we cannot even talk of such constant conjunctions, or of sensory 
impressions at all, at least not of the kind that amount to experience of a world, without applying the 
categories. The basic pattern is this: the empiricist claims that some sophisticated concept is not to 
be drawn from basic sensory experience, and that it must thus be discarded; the Kantian response is 
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that this basic sensory experience is itself impossible without the applicability of the sophisticated 
concept. So if the basic sensory experience is secure, so is the sophisticated concept. This is one way 
to understand what a transcendental justification amounts to. 
 
Apart from the concept of cause, Hume sounded a (very loud, and eternally ringing) skeptical note 
about induction. Induction is a method of scientific reasoning that takes us beyond basic sensory 
experience to something more sophisticated—prediction of the future, for example—and is thus 
suspect, on his empiricist grounds. We should perhaps expect Kant to seek a transcendental 
justification of induction, as of the categories of cause, substance, and so on. This expectation has been 
noted by, for example, T.D. Weldon: 
[The] scientific half of [Kant] wanted to establish the validity of scientific reasoning against 
Hume’s criticism at almost any price. He was not very clear as to what this entailed, but in 
his language scepticism as to the principle of induction was as reprehensible as idealism; 
Hume was as troublesome as Berkeley. Hence he has to establish and elaborate his doctrine of 
categories or pure concepts of the understanding.[KCPR, pp. 178-9; my emphasis] 
 
Weldon claims not only that Kant is interested in rescuing induction, but that his method of doing 
this—this is very strongly suggested by the occurrence of ‘hence’—is the establishment (viz., 
justification) and elaboration of his doctrine of categories.  
 
Justifying the application of the categories is justifying their application to objects of intuition. It is thus 
natural to ask whether induction should play any role in the answer to the questions (i) whether such 
application (to objects of intuition) is justified; and (ii) what such application amounts to.18 It is here 
that we turn to Longuenesse and her KCJ. Longuenesse believes that the categories play an 
important role in cognition that has been long overlooked by commentators: they serve as rules for the 
generation of empirical concepts. She gives an account according to which there can be no empirical 
concepts without the categories—precisely because the categories guide the very generation of these 
concepts—and according to which there can be no categories without their serving to generate 
empirical concepts. The former thesis may be considered as Kant’s rejoinder to Hume; the latter as 
his rejoinder to Leibniz.19 
 
                                                
18 I use the noncommittal expression ‘amounts to’ because I wish to avoid the psychologism of which Kant is accused, 
famously by Strawson, who derided the “imaginary subject of transcendental psychology” [BS]. 
19 I shall discuss this thesis as Kant’s rejoinder to Leibniz in section VI, in which I bring it to bear in constructing a 
positive epistemology of modality, a consequence of the account of intentionality that I have explored. 
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I wish to suggest that this generation of empirical concepts can be understood as an inductive 
generation, that these concepts are generated by induction, in precisely the sense in which, I have 
claimed, the content of empirical predicates is constituted by principles whose adoption is 
inductively justified.20 Though Longuenesse scarcely ever uses the term ‘induction’, it appears in 
some very important places. She says, for example, that in the Dissertation  
Kant argued that, on the one hand, we have empirical cognitions in which we generate our 
concepts inductively from experience and subordinate them to one another in accordance with the 
rules of the “logical use of the understanding”; and, on the other hand, we possess “pure concepts” 
arising from “the laws of the mind alone, when we reflect on the sensible.” [KCJ p.27, 
emphasis mine] 
 
Most of the time, however, she follows Kant in discussing operations of concept formation through  
“comparison, reflection, and abstraction”.  
 
But first, some very compressed background. In the Trascendental Deduction in A, Kant outlines 
the structure of a threefold synthesis: the synthesis of apprehension in intuition; the synthesis of 
reproduction in imagination; and the synthesis of recognition in a concept. 
 
An intuition is a “singular and immediate” representation of an object “whose matter is sensation” 
[Logik §1 Ak. IX 91; 589]. (It is the matter of the intuition that is sensation.) It is clear that the notion 
of an intuition is a factive notion, in light of Kant’s careful distinction of intuitions from other kinds 
of “representation with consciousness (perceptio)”21: 
A perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is a sensation (sensatio); 
an objective perception is a cognition (cognitio). The latter is either an intuition or a 
concept (intuitus vel conceptus). The former is immediately related to the object and is 
singular… [CPR A320/B377, underlining mine] 
 
So it is safe to consider intuitions as analogues of my conceptual representings with singular 
demonstrative contents—viz., observations. I also claimed that it was important that we may see 
objects: that is, that such conceptual representings are sensory, and that they must be so to play the 
intentional role I ascribed to them, because this sensory aspect was what gave them the kind of 
immediacy necessary to play this role (this against Brandom, Rosenberg, and Sellars, who claim that no 
                                                
20 I have felt free to move between ‘concept’ and ‘predicate’, whereas Kant talks only of concepts. I shall end this section 
with a brief nod to some of his own comments that suggest that he might not be unfriendly to my theoretically 
deliberate sloppiness.  
21 Note that ‘representation’ in Kant’s mouth does not seem to be factive. 
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intentional state exhibits this kind of immediacy). There is some indication that Kant is, in this 
respect too, my ally; Longuenesse writes: 
Hintikka has claimed that Kant’s “immediacy criterion” for intuition was in fact redundant, 
and that intuition was sufficiently distinguished from concept by its being characterized as a 
singular representation, namely the referent of a singular term. But I think that for Kant the 
two defining characters of intuition are inseparable. … I agree with Parsons, that the 
phenomenological component of the notion of intuition, as involving some “direct presence 
to the mind,” is important to Kant. [KCJ p. 220 fn. 15]22 
  
This “direct presence to the mind” is reminiscent of the notion of observation as construed by the 
disjunctive conception of experience.23 I shall proceed as though having established that Kant’s 
intuitions parallel my observations.24 
 
An intuition is the product of an operation of synthesis effectuated on the manifold of sensibility. 
This synthesis proceeds according to a rule of apprehension, or schema. A rule of apprehension is a rule 
for synthesizing a manifold of sensibility into an intuition. Though I shall continue to use this 
terminology where necessary for my (very compressed) exposition of Kant, it should be noted that I 
shall not countenance the synthesis of manifolds as such in my own account, since such a synthesis 
is not, as far as I can tell, an epistemological operation, and since I am concerned exclusively with 
matters epistemic (as always, -cum-intentional). 
 
What of the synthesis of reproduction? Talk of reproduction is talk of association. Hume wished to 
reduce talk of causal relations to talk of associations of impressions (or types thereof); Kant insists, 
contra the empiricists, that association must have some a priori ground if it is to be part of genuine 
experience: 
…we must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of imagination as conditioning the very 
possibility of experience. For experience as such necessarily presupposes the reproducibility of 
appearances. [CPR A101-2, emphasis mine] 
 
                                                
22 Longuenesse here refers to Hintikka’s“In. and Parson’s PA, TA. 
23 Of course, I insist that observations put us in direct epistemological commerce with bits of the world—with the world 
itself, with the world in itself. This is not a position Kant could have held, though he may have held an “interiorized” 
variation thereof. 
24 There is an obvious difference between them, of course. Intuitions do not have propositional content, while 
observations do. This is the difference between the content of ‘this cat’ and ‘this is a cat before me’. Though this is an 
important difference—see, for example, McDowell’s AMG— I do not think that it bears directly on the central 
considerations here. 
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Note that Kant says here not that experience presupposes that we do reproduce apperances, but that 
appearances be reproducible: that is, that we have the right to reproduce them. That we lacked such a 
right is precisely what Hume believed, because this right could not be derived from experience. Kant 
wishes to derive such a right from the premise that experience of the world is possible.  
 
To effectuate syntheses of apprehension that produce intuitions, one must effectuate syntheses of 
reproduction in imagination, since “experience as such presupposes the reproducibility of appearances”.25 But 
to effectuate syntheses of reproduction, there must be an a priori ground of reproducibility. Part of 
the a priori ground of such reproducibility is to be found in an explication of the notion of the 
synthesis of recognition in a concept. Here we see the emergence of discursivity. Why must there be a 
discursive synthesis—that is, the subsumption of an intuition by a concept—in order for there to be 
reproductive synthesis by the imagination?  
 
The answer is, in brief, that in order to associate some representation with others, we must see them 
as having something in common: that is, we must have, in Longuenesse’s phrase, “consciousness of 
the generic identity between the reproductive representation and all those preceding it” [KCJ p.46].26  
 
So, as Longuenesse says: 
No intuition without imagination, no intuition leading to representation of (determinate) object 
without transcendental imagination—that is, imagination “under the unity of apperception”. 
[KCJ p. 109] 
 
But what does the unity of apperception have to do with this? The answer is that the synthesis of 
recognition in a concept is only possible under the unity of apperception. I shall not discuss the 
reasons now—this is not, after all, a commentary on the Trascendental Deduction—but suffice it to 
say (for my purposes) that the unity of apperception is correlative with discursivity; and the synthesis 
of recognition in a concept is discursive synthesis. So the synthesis of the imagination “under the unity 
                                                
25 I shall not attempt to recapitulate Kant’s argument here. But I think that the point is well taken. The following 
rhetorical question will have to suffice as support. Imagine if no sensory experience were connected with any other: 
would any really count as a sensory experience at all?  
26 I am here departing somewhat from Longuenesse’s exposition. She represents Kant as thinking that we can have 
“merely associative” reproduction without being conscious of generic identities, but that this is not enough for 
experience of the world, which requires discursive synthesis because only this last is related to universal and general 
representations, viz. concepts. These themes will emerge later; but my divergence is not, in any case, detrimental to my 
assaying the parallel of interest here. 
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of apperception” is the synthesis of the imagination that occurs in consort with the (discursive) 
synthesis of recognition in a concept. 
 
The threefold synthesis with which we began thus relies on its most sophisticated aspect: the 
discursive synthesis. We have seen that discursive synthesis is conceptual. What is a concept? 
 
A concept is a single rule with two aspects. The first is its aspect as discursive rule, as may be 
characterized by its role in a syllogism, or, more generally, in inference. The second is its aspect as rule 
of synthesis speciosa, the synthesis of the imagination that yields intuitions. This aspect of a concept is 
its schema, or rule of apprehension, as mentioned above.27  
 
I mentioned above two questions above in connection with the application of the categories to 
intuition. The first question was whether we had the right to such application; the second was what 
such application amounted to. One might also (though at the risk of speaking in a psychologistic 
tone of voice) ask about the “mechanics” of such application. And, indeed, one might ask about the 
mechanics of the application to intuitions of concepts in general—both a priori and a posteriori, or 
empirical. One of my aims in this section is to make sense of how predicates, whose content I 
characterized inferentially—that is, discursively—could be understood as having a representational 
aspect. Kant’s concepts, we have seen, have both an inferential and representational aspect; in the 
latter aspect they are rules of apprehension, or schemata, that guide synthesis speciosa. Given this 
parallel, we might suspect that an investigation of how, according to Kant, these aspects are related 
would assist me in my own aim.   
 
Recall that discursivity is associated with the original synthetic unity of apperception. That is, being a 
discursive beast requires being apperceptive, in this sense. Bringing cognitions—we should think 
about intuitions in particular—to the unity of apperception is done, according to Kant, by 
                                                
27 I am simplifying considerably here. In particular, I am saying that a concept has two aspects, one of which is a rule of 
apprehension—that is, a rule that guides the synthesis of an intuition. But intuitions are supposed to be nonconceptual (for it 
is the understanding, or spontaneity, that is the monger of concepts, not sensibility, which is mere receptivity). Indeed, 
Longuenesse maintains that intuitions are nonconceptual, and this is an important aspect of her account of the 
generation of empirical concepts by application of the categories. But she yet understands them as the result of an 
operation of spontaneity (the understanding) on receptivity (sensibility)—which is how McDowell explicates his view 
that intuitions are conceptual. [MW] This last suggests that we may choose whether to understand intuitions as 
conceptual or as nonconceptual and yet maintain that they are synthesized according to rules of spontaneity, and in 
particular according to ruels of apprehension that constitute one of the aspects of concepts. 
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application of the logical forms of judgment. (So being a wielder of such forms is being an apperceptive 
beast: this is what Brandom means when he says that “logic is the organ of semantic self-
consciousness” [RIP]). Typically, Kant’s argument for this claim is summarized thus. The logical 
forms of judgment are correlative with the categories; application of the categories is a necessary 
condition of bringing cognitions to the unity of apperception; therefore, we bring cognitions to the 
unity of apperception by application of the logical forms of judgment. The first premise in this 
argument—that the logical forms of judgment are correlative with the categories—is understood as 
argued in the Metaphysical Deduction of the CPR, a section that was famously declared a failure (or 
at least unsuccessful) by Strawson in BS.   
 
Longuenesse wishes to characterize the structure of Kant’s argument rather differently. Our 
question was what role concepts had in intuition. (We put it this way: what is the connection 
between the two roles of a concept—between a concept’s aspect as discursive rule, and its aspect as 
rule of synthesis speciosa?) And we know that concepts are constituted by their role in judgment. (This 
is another way of putting the claim that they have a discursive aspect.) If we show how the logical 
forms of judgment are related to intuition, we shall have gone some distance toward showing what 
the connection is between the two roles of a concept. But we should not, says Longuenesse, now 
turn to the Metaphysical Deduction. Rather, we should see that Kant believes that the logical forms 
of judgment have a role in generating empirical concepts. And they do this by operating on sensibility. 
Following this path is the key to discovering how the discursive and intuitive aspects of concepts are 
related. 
 
Longuenesse claims that the logical forms of judgment are correlative with concepts of comparison, as 
discussed in the appendix to Chapter III of the Analytic of Principles, on the amphiboly of concepts 
of reflection. I omit consideration of the details of this correlation (upon which I am not in any case 
in a position to remark). Let us note that concepts of comparison, like all concepts, are rules. In 
particular, they are rules of comparison. I wish to characterize them as rules of inductive comparison.   
 
Of course, not all comparison is inductive. Indeed, Kant distinguishes comparison that yields 
empirical concepts from comparison that does not; he calls the latter aesthetic comparison, the former 
universalizing comparison. My claim is only that universalizing comparison may be understood as 
inductive. This is comparison that essentially involves abstraction and reflection, for otherwise, says 
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Longuenesse, it cannot be geared toward the production of concepts—viz., universal 
representations. [KCJ p.116]  
 
Let us consider an example, adapted from Kant. Suppose I have not yet acquired the concept tree. I 
come across a linden, an elm, and a beech. Each has a trunk, and bark, and branches, and leaves; but 
each differs from the other in certain respects. I may thus compare their common features—trunk, 
bark, branches, leaves—and collect these marks—a term inherited from the Wolffian tradition under 
the schema for tree, thus generating this schema (according to the rules of comparison a discussion 
of which I chose to omit). Longuenesse characterizes the schema as, at this point, preconceptual. It 
attains unto discursivity when spontaneity performs an operation of reflection, at which point a full-
fledged concept springs from the schema. 
 
Before I discuss what this last could mean, I wish to recharacterize this example in inductive terms. 
The idea is, in brief, that I have observations whose pronounced equivalents are 
 This [demonstrating to the beech] tree has bark 
 This [demonstrating to the linden] tree has bark 
 This [demonstrating to the elm] tree has bark 
 … 
 So I shall adopt the principle 
  that x is a tree implies that x has bark 
 
and similarly for ‘has leaves’, ‘has a trunk’, and so on. The principle of material inference that I adopt 
is part of what constitutes the content of the predicate ‘tree’ (and of the predicate ‘bark’, but let us 
abstract away from this complication here). To put it another way: this discursive rule that I adopt may 
be identified with the concept tree.  
 
Now, if the content of ‘tree’ is constituted by principles of material inference, an example of which I 
have given here, how can it be that my observations (or the pronounced equivalents thereof) of 
form 
 this [with appropriate demonstration] tree is F 
had content when I made them? For ‘tree’ is included here, and yet its content, I have claimed, is 
(partially) embodied in the principle of material inference that will be the terminal outcome of the 
very induction that I am currently effectuating. 
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Notice that Longuenesse’s Kant faces a similar question. For to generate a schema for tree, having 
intuited several objects, it must have been that such intuitions were synthesized according to a rule 
of apprehension—that is, a schema. And for these objects to be recognized as being generically 
identical, it must be that the same schema applied to all of them. But this is the schema for tree. So the 
schema for tree must have applied to these objects even before it was generated! 
 
Now, schemata are associated with concepts, so this in turn implies that the concept tree must have 
been present before one began to compare the trees in the first place. That is, one must have had 
the capacity to judge that this is a tree before me before one even generated the capacity to judge that this 
is a tree before me. This would seem to be paradoxical, but Longuenesse assures us that it is not. She 
quotes Steckelmacher as saying that concepts are generated by “an act of judging carried on silently”: 
In the operations of “comparison, reflection, and abstraction,” one must recognize an act of 
judging carried out silently, however incompletely achieved it might be [ein wenn auch nur 
unvollkommenes, im Stillen sich vollziehendes Urteilen], which in this very incompleteness is proper 
to the first formation of concepts, and which consequently must be taken into account 
before any consideration of genuine and fully achieved judgments. [FL 21-22, quoted in KCJ 
p.122] 
 
We may think of the concepts, or schemata, of tree in my intuitions of the elm, beech, and linden—
or, in my vocabulary, of the content of ‘tree’ in my observations of the elm, beech, and linden—as, 
in some sense, incipient, as blind and “silent”. Of course, this would suggest that no word would be 
attached to the incipient concept—what else could it mean that the incipient concept is “silent”? 
And, indeed, I am willing to confess that the inductions that justify the material inference that 
constitute the content of our empirical predicates are usually not made explicit as inductions. They may 
be understood as blind, incipient inductions.  
 
I shall by the end of this section have clarified the notion of the blind, incipient induction. But for 
now I turn to the other of the two questions of this section: how is the horizontal to be projected 
onto the vertical? How, that is, do predicates, whose meaning is inferentially articulated, have 
representational application? I shall try to indicate the barest outlines of my answer to this question, 
though it must be borne in mind that it is, at this stage, rather undeveloped. What follows might be 
considered a case study. I shall deal only with the temporal aspect of sensuality, leaving aside the 
question of how spatiality is discursively constituted. 
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Imagine that I am sitting at table and locate a glass of wine. I have the conceptual representing that 
this is a glass of wine before me. Of course, when I identify the object in question, I identify it not as a 
bare this, but as a this-such: and if I continue to represent the object, I may represent it as this glass of 
wine. The question is this: what, in my perceptual-conceptual representing, is equivalent to the 
content of the word ‘wine’? I have said that the content of empirical predicates is embodied in 
principles of material inference. Must I say now that, over and above such principles of inference, 
empirical predicates are also, as a separate matter, attached to phenomenal characters, so that I may 
identify a piece of my perceptual-conceptual representing as corresponding to the word ‘wine’?  
 
To say this would constitute a departure from the strong inferentialist thesis—for according to this 
thesis, the content of ‘wine’ is exhaustively embodied in principles of material inference, such that any 
extra attachment—of phenomenal character, or whatever else—is irrelevant with respect to meaning.  
 
But of course I have already departed from the strong inferentialist thesis in insisting that when I 
have a conceptual representing with essentially singular demonstrative content—content corresponding to 
a ‘this’—possessing such content is not a matter of one’s having made the correct moves in the game 
of inference but one of having the object in question in one’s view. My question, then, is whether 
another departure from strict inferentialism is called for here, whether ‘wine’ must be attached to 
what-wine-looks-like, as a matter separate from that of its attachment to principles of material 
inference. 
 
This last question I shall answer in the negative. I wish to suggest, on the contrary, that what-wine-
looks-like is merely the sensuous transposition of a set of inferential principles: what the 
instantiation, or tokening, of principles of material inference looks like. I derive inspiration in this 
connection from the Analytic of Principles in the CPR, once again, perhaps, at one Longuenessian 
remove. The question for Kant that serves as the analogue of my question is expressed thus by 
Longuenesse: how it is possible for realities given us by sensation to be determined in respect of the 
relation between subject and predicate? [KCJ p. 332] Here, a reality given by sensation may be 
understood as a certain spatiotemporal order characterized by extensive and intensive magnitude: for 
example, if I imagine a coordinate system with the origin placed between my eyes, I may locate an 
intensification of being, so to say, in the area described by some equation in terms of x, y, and z, 
such that this intensification takes up that area—this is extensive magnitude—and corresponds to the 
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texture and redness of the wine—this is the intensive magnitude. A reality is determinable if I may 
subsume it by a concept; and determined if it is thus subsumed. The question here is this: we have a 
sensual spatiotemporal order, characterized in terms of both extensive and intensive magnitude—
the former corresponding to the amount (quantity) of spacetime occupied, the second by, we might 
say, the qualities of the occupation, the nature of the intensification of being in the spacetime 
occupied. How is it that this very sensual spatiotemporal order is itself conceptual? Since I have said 
that the contents of concepts are embodied in principles of material inference, the question, for me, 
is this: how it is that this very sensual spatiotemporal order is itself inferentially articulated? To put it 
another way: how does discursivity give order to sensuality? 
 
With respect to the predicate ‘wine’, and its correlative concept wine, there is no need to say that 
these have an inferential aspect, and a representational aspect, and that these two are unrelated. Rather, 
the representational aspects of predicates are the ways of instantiating, or tokening, their inferential 
aspects, so that sensuous representation is, as such, preparation for, and the result of, inference, and 
impossible without it. This is one way—though, it must be emphasized, only one way—of making 
sense of McDowell’s insistence that perception is shot through with concepts. (My way is not, 
strictly speaking, amenable to McDowell, since he also insists that there is no need, in making sense 
of his view, to engage in the sort of theoretical construction that is my project here. This is perhaps 
my most significant departure from McDowell’s thought. I insist on a story where he insists that 
none is needed.) 
 
Let us begin by considering the grammatico-logical categories of subject and predicate. I submit that 
these are correlative with the categories of substance and cause. The first correlation may seem natural; 
the second, perhaps, unexpected. What is doubly surprising is that, as it will turn out, the story of 
the second correlation is an essential chapter in the story of the first. 
 
A substance is something that persists through change over time. Descartes’s lump of wax may be 
molded into different shapes, and thus undergo alteration, but it is yet it that is undergoing alteration, 
and the it in question is a substance. The example of the lump of wax was meant to demonstrate 
that we could not know substances except a priori, since although everything we see might change, we 
yet insist that there is some thing that has persisted: the lump of wax itself, which we never see except 
through its constantly changing properties.  
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Notice that, in the very characterization of the notion of substance, I have made essential reference 
to persistence through change. This is, indeed, part of what serves to distinguish substance from 
accident: substances are persistent, accidents ephemeral. (Of course, we might say that it is a condition 
on the identity of a substance over time that it retain some particular property, and in that case we 
say that this is an essential property of a substance.28)  
 
The key insight of Kant in this connection is this, that not only must we make reference to 
persistence through change over time in characterizing the notion of substance; we must make 
reference to the notion of substance in characterizing the very idea of change over time, and, indeed, the 
very idea of the temporal order itself. Thus the First Analogy of Experience in A: 
All appearances contain that which persists (substance) as the object itself, and that which 
can change as its mere determination, i.e., a way in which the object exists. [A182] 
 
and the conclusion of the Proof of the First Analogy in B: 
Consequently that which persists, in relation to which alone all temporal relations of 
appearances can be determined, is substance in the appearance, i.e., the real in the 
appearance, which as the substratum of all change always remains the same. [B225] 
 
Here, then, is the first clue to answering our question how discurisivity gives order to sensuality. The 
grammatico-logical category of subject has its sensuous reflection in our perception of substance; and 
such perception is a necessary condition of there obtaining a sensuous temporal order. (I shall say, at 
the end of my plundering of the Analogies of Experience, precisely what I mean by having a 
category of discursivity’s having a “sensuous reflection” in perception. What Longuenesse’s Kant 
means by this is that our perceptual faculty is itself ordered by spontaneity—that is, discursivity—by 
an act of synthesis speciosa, such that this synthesis yields the formal (and discursively ordered) 
intuitions of space and time. But I cannot appeal to an explication in the terms of transcendental 
psychology, for I have insisted on an entirely epistemological inquiry. My explication is inspired by 
Brewer’s work and will be couched in terms of reasons for belief.) 
 
                                                
28 The distinction between essential and contingent properties, in this sense, is, I think, captured by the Leibnizian-
Wolffian distinction, appropriated by Kant and discussed by Longuenesse [KCJ p. 340] between two kinds of marks 
(roughly, properties) to be attributed to permanent objects: “permanent marks” and “synthetic changing marks”. A 
permanent mark F of x is such that, if x were to lose F, x would be no longer. 
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The application of the category of substance is necessary for experience as-of a temporal order, for 
substances are what do not change. In contrast, accidents are what do change, in the alteration of 
substances. Change cannot, in order to be experienced by us, be willy-nilly. It must be regular; it 
must proceed according to a rule. Thus the Second Analogy of Experience, which I reproduce in 
both its formulations: 
Everything that happens (begins to be) presupposes something which it follows in 
accordance with a rule. [A189] 
All alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect. 
[B232] 
 
What grammatico-logical category corresponds to the “rules” in accordance with which alterations 
occur? It is the hypothetical form of judgment, which, Kant says, “indicates the relation of ground to 
consequence”. [MV Ak. XXVIII-1, 397] Longuenesse writes: 
A ground is what we reflect under concepts in the consequent of a hypothetical proposition. 
Or more precisely, the relation of ground to consequence (ratio/rationatum, Grund/Folge) has 
no other meaning than that generated by the act of the understanding in a hypothetical 
judgment. [CKJ, p 346; emphasis in the original] 
 
Now, I wish to suggest that this hypothetical form of judgment is precisely the form of the 
principles of material inference that are central to my project, and that those principles that embody 
the content of empirical predicates are especially important in our present connection. That I am 
justified in my suggestion is brought out by consideration of Kant’s distinction between logical 
reason (ratio logica) and real reason (ratio realis): 
Every reason is either logical—and thereby the consequence is posited per regulam identitatis, a 
consequence which is identical to it… Or it is real—and thereby the consequence is not 
posited per regulam identitatis, a consequence which is not identical to it. [MH, Ak. XXVIII-1, 
12.] 
 
Let us consider, for example,  
 If a man be a bachelor, then he should be unmarried 
which we regard as an analytic truth. Here, the consequence, as it were—or Folge, or rationatum—
which is embodied in the consequent of the conditional, is posited per regulam identitatis. That is, a 
man’s being unmarried is identical to a man’s being a bachelor. (It is for this reason that we are 
reluctant to say that there is any “consequence”, in the causal sense, embodied in the consequent: 
there is no causation involved, only identity). Whereas 
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 If a piece of sodium be thrown into water, then there should occur a violent explosion 
is regarded as a synthetic truth. And here, the consequence—which we happily call the 
“consequence”—is not posited per regulam identitatis. This is an illustration of the difference between 
a ratio logica and a ratio realis. A man’s being a bachelor is a ratio logica for his being unmarried; whereas 
a piece of sodium’s being thrown into water is a ratio realis for a violent explosion’s occurring. 
 
The principles of material inference that embody the content of empirical predicates are of the 
second kind. Their explicit subjunctive renderings are thus synthetic truths, despite their constituting 
the meaning of empirical predicates. This is no paradox: the lesson is merely that it was misleading to 
say that analytic truths are those true “by meaning alone”. Facts about the world enter into the 
meanings of our words, and in that case the explicit subjunctive renderings of the principles of 
meaning (inference) in question are synthetic. But facts about the world do not enter into the 
meanings of all our words in the same way. For example, Kant regards it as an analytic truth that 
 if justice were to reign, then the evil should be punished  
which, it is clear, is not the subjunctive rendering of a principle of inference adopted on inductive 
grounds.  
 
This would suggest, then, the following way of making the distinction between the analytic and the 
synthetic. Those propositions are analytic whose adoption is not—at least not in the sense of my 
project—required to be justified inductively.29  
 
Before I terminate this digression on the analytic and the synthetic, there are two immediately 
obvious objections that might be made to my suggestion. The first: “It cannot be that synthetic 
(concept-constituting) principles are those that must be inductively justified. For the principles of 
the understanding are synthetic (concept-constituting, and in particular category-constituting30) 
                                                
29 Of course, I talk of adoption of principles, not propositions; but we may speak loosely of adopting propositions, where 
this means adopting principles of material inference of which the propositions in question are explicit subjunctive 
renderings. It might be objected that not all analytic truths are in the subjunctive. For example, is not 
 a bachelor is an unmarried man 
in the indicative? I do not think so. For this is obviously not a straightforward existentially quantified sentence which 
means 
 there is an x such that x is a bachelor and x is unmarried. 
Rather, this is some kind of generic statement in which an indefinite description is employed. It would be unsurprising if 
generics were closely related to subjunctives. 
30 This characterization may be at odds with Kant, according to whom the principles of the understanding are regulative 
and not constitutive principles.  
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principles, and these are transcendentally deduced, not induced. Indeed, induction is only justifiable 
because those principles regulating the application of the categories of substance and cause are 
justified.31 And surely it cannot be denied that these a priori concepts are constituted by synthetic 
principles. For it is the whole point of the CPR to show that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible!” 
My (preliminary) answer to this first objection is that there are two kinds of synthetic principles: the 
synthetic a priori and the synthetic a posteriori. Our adoption of principles of the latter kind is 
inductively justified; while it is principles of the former kind that are preconditions of induction’s 
being justified. This is one way of putting Longuenesse’s point that the categories function 
essentially as rules that guide the inductive generation of empirical concepts. So although the 
categories are not themselves inductively generated—that is, not synthesized a posteriori—they are the 
preconditions of such synthesis, hence synthetic a priori principles. 
 
The second objection: “You claim that principles of material inference are synthetic a posteriori 
concept-constituting principles. But then a principle made explicit 
 if sodium be thrown into water, then a violent explosion should occur 
is true ex vi terminorum; that is, by the force of the words ‘water’ and ‘sodium’ (and so on). But then 
its truth is simply a matter of the concepts with which we approach the world, and not a matter of 
facts. How, then, are such principles a posteriori?” 
 
Indeed, Sellars affirms, in his SAP, that such principles of material inference are synthetic a priori, for 
just this reason. For although, as he admits, there is an important sense in which the adoption of 
such principles requires experience, this is not, for Sellars, a logical but a merely psychological 
requirement. Though the concepts sodium and water are acquired under the causal action of sodium 
and water upon us, this is an empirico-historico-psychological, and not a logical, matter. With respect 
to intentionality as such, the principle in question is a priori.  
 
I obviously disagree. For I have been urging that our inductive generation of concepts—that is, our 
inductively justified adoption of the principles that constitute their content—is of logical import. And 
so I insist that it matters to the epistemic status of such principles where they come from. Since any 
principle is a posteriori that is derived, as an epistemic (and not merely psychological) matter from 
                                                
31 And, I should insist, vice versa. The application of the categories of substance and cause is only justified if induction is. 
That is, the notion of induction and that of cause are correlative. 
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experience, I say that those principles of material inference that constitute the content of empirical 
predicates are synthetic a posteriori principles. 
 
There is more to be extracted from Kant’s distinction between ratio logica and ratio realis. Let us 
consider his discussion of hypothetical judgments, modus ponens, ground, and the distinction between 
the analytic and the synthetic, in a Reflexion, one of the first known instances, according to 
Longuenesse, of Kant’s own analytic/synthetic distinction [CPR p. 353]: 
The relation of reason ponens is connection, tollens is opposition [Respectus rationis ponentis est 
nexus, tollentis est oppositio]. 
 
The relation of logical reason ponens or tollens is analytic—rational. [Respectus rationis logicae vel 
ponendi vel tollendi est analyticus—rationalis]. 
 
The relation of real reason ponens or tollens is synthetic—empirical. [Respectus rationis realis vel 
ponendi vel tollendi est syntheticus—empiricus]. [Refl. 3753, Ak. XVII, 283] 
 
Here, ratio logica corresponds to “logical reason”, ratio realis to “real reason”. It is obvious that there is 
a necessary connection in case of the relation of logical reason ponens. For this is, as we have seen, 
merely a question of identity. That is, there is a necessary connection—a connection of analytic 
necessity—between a man’s being a bachelor and his being married. To represent this explicitly as a 
ponens, we may say that we have the major premise 
 If a man is a bachelor, then he is unmarried 
and the minor premise 
 x is a man and a bachelor 
we may conclude, by modus ponens, 
 x is unmarried. 
This is an analytic ponens because the major premise is analytic. We may contrast it with the following 
synthetic ponens: 
 If a piece of sodium is thrown into water, then a violent explosion occurs 
 E is an event of a piece of sodium’s being thrown into water 
 therefore, E is followed by an explosion 
 
where this is a synthetic ponens because the major premise is synthetic. 
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But how do we characterize the necessary connection between a lump of sodium’s being placed in 
water and an explosion’s occurring? This is not a connection of analytic necessity. It is a connection 
of synthetic necessity. How do we understand synthetic necessity? Thus Longuenesse: the synthetic 
modus ponens  
will become comprehensible only when it is no longer thought as depending on the connection of the 
concepts combined—as is the case when the major premise of the modus ponens expresses an 
analytic connection between antecedent and consequent—but instead, the concepts combined are 
themselves dependent on the act of generating a ratio ponens, that is, when the act of the undersanding 
in the hypothetical judgment is understood as governing the formation of (empirical) concepts and, 
even prior to this, as generating the order of the sensible representations it is called upon to connect. 
[KCJ p. 353; emphasis in the original] 
 
That is to say that the kind of synthetic necessity embodied in the major premise of our synthetic 
ponens is the kind of necessity that the understanding must be capable of grasping in order to form 
empirical concepts at all—this is one way of expressing the thought that the applicability of the idea 
of causal necessity is a necessary condition of justified induction—and, indeed, to form the very 
sensible representations that are connected by this necessity. 
 
That is: unless we thought of the explosion’s as following the sodium’s being dropped in the water 
according to a rule, where this is a rule of necessary connection, the lump of sodium itself would not be sensible 
to us as such (sodium). The causal relations into which the lump sodium enters, which we recapitulate 
as inferential relations, are perceived by us as belonging to the lump of sodium; and our perceiving 
them as belonging to it is necessary for us to see the lump as what it is (sodium). This, so far, is simply 
Kant. Enter Longuenesse’s Kant: not only must we think of objects as standing in causal relations 
(of the pertinent modal significance) in order to see these objects at all; the reason is that seeing these 
objects as the objects that they are requires that we determine these objects—that is, subsume them 
by concepts, which can be generated inductively only by our looking for the causal connections in 
which we know they must stand. That is to say that our application of the category of cause can only 
occur when we exploit the category to generate recapitulations of the world’s particular causal laws. 
To put it another way: induction is required for us to apply the category of cause. (Of course, cause is 
required for induction, too: the two are correlative, and arise, as it were, together.)  
 
My original question was that of how spatiotemporal sensuality was inferentially structured. I have 
the material to give the answer. Temporal order involves change, and this must always occur as 
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though according to a rule, for otherwise I should have no experience as-of a temporal order. That 
is, the order of temporality is itself a sensuous reflection of the order of inference. The logico-
grammatical categories of subjective and predicate are sensually realized in the following way. The 
notion of substance, correlative with subject, is part of what constitutes temporality; for there would 
be no temporal order without the notion of something’s persisting through change. Nor would there 
be such an order without the notion of something’s changing—of the alteration of the persistent 
subject—and these things that change are accidents. But they are the accidents they are in virtue of 
the rules by which they change—the causal rules by which alone change occurs, of which we assay 
the recapitulation in developing a system of inferential principles. So the very structure of 
spatiotemporal sensuality as such is constituted by subject and predicate, where the latter is a notion of 
something that is inferentially articulated.  
 
In the very intensification of being that is the wine, which takes up the space described by the 
equation in terms of x, y, and z, is the expectation of change according to an inferential rule. The 
wine itself looks like the kind of thing that is made from grapes, and that will bring me joy if I drink 
it. All of this information is condensed in the very character of the phenomenal appearance of the 
wine itself. And this is because the spatiotemporal structure of this phenomenal appearance is itself 
discursively constituted.  
 
I have thus far only gestured at the manner of this constitution: I have given it a modal 
characterization—“I could not have experience as-of temporal change without experience as-of a 
substance, and change according to a rule”—and have ruled out a psychologistic characterization. I 
wish now to give it a robustly epistemological characterization.  
 
Let us take Kant as having established the following, which I characterize in the modal tone of voice 
I used above. 
First Analogy of Experience. I could not have experience as-of temporal succession unless 
I had experience as-of a substance (where this is experience as-of the permanence of 
determinable reality—that is, a conceptualizable spatiotemporal region of extensive and 
intensive magnitude). 
 
Second Analogy of Experience.  I could not have experience as-of temporal succession 
unless I had experience as-of change (=the alteration of substance) according to a rule. 
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And let us take one of the main epistemological theses of Brewer’s book, discussed in section IV, 
for granted: 
  
Brewer’s Thesis Recast. My having a conceptual-perceptual representing with content that-
P is a reason for me to believe that-P. 
 
Now I wish to establish the following theorems (so called!), which are an epistemological 
characterization of the thesis that sensuous spatiotemporality is, as such, discursively structured. 
Theorem 1. If I have an experience as-of temporal succession, then I thereby have a reason 
to believe a content that-P as-with an essentially singular demonstrative component this-F. 
 
Proof. Suppose I have an experience as-of temporal succession. Then, by the First Analogy 
of Experience, I have an experience as-of a substance. That is, I have a conceptual-
perceptual representing with an essentially singular demonstrative component this-F, for this 
is what it is to have an experience as-of a substance. By Brewer’s Thesis Recast, this 
conceptual-representing is a reason for me to believe its content, which is as-with an 
essentially singular demonstrative component this-F. So if I have an experience as-of 
temporal succession, then I thereby have a reason to believe a content as-with an essentially 
singular demonstrative component this-F. 
 
Theorem 2. If I have an experience as-of temporal succession, then I thereby have a reason 
to believe a content that-P containing empirical predicates whose content is embodied in 
principles of material inference. 
 
Proof. Suppose I have an experience as-of temporal succession. Then, by the Second 
Analogy of Experience, I have experience as-of change according to a rule. That is, I have a 
conceptual-perceptual representing some of whose content corresponds to an empirical 
predicate whose content is constituted inferentially, for this is what it is to have an 
experience as-of change according to a rule. By Brewer’s Thesis Recast, this conceptual-
representing is a reason for me to believe its content, part of which is constituted 
inferentially. So if I have experience as-of temporal succession, then I thereby have a reason 
to believe a content that-P containing empirical predicates whose content is embodied in 
principles of material inference.  
 
Why have I prefixed ‘as-‘ to certain occurrences of ‘of’ and ‘with’? This is meant to capture the idea 
that the experiences in question have representational purport, though they may nonetheless 
sometimes fail to represent. When they succeed in representing, we may say that these experiences 
are, quite simply, of objects, and with singular demonstrative content: for this is simply a consequence 
of the disjunctive conception of experience that I adopted in section IV. 
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Let us turn again to my second question: how could it be, if the content of ‘F’ and ‘G’ is embodied 
in a principle of material inference 
that x is F implies that x is G 
that observations  
 this F is G 
 this F is G 
 … 
 
were meaningful when they were made, antecedent to the adoption of the principle of inference 
towards which their being made was directed?  
 
Let us consider an example. Suppose I know that sodium reacts violently with water, but not that it 
reacts violently with the halogens. Let us consider fluorine in particular. I may induce thus: 
 this lump of sodium reacts violently with fluorine 
 this lump of sodium reacts violently with fluorine 
 so I shall adopt [that x is a lump of sodium implies that x reacts violently with fluorine] 
 
Surely, one might say, ‘sodium’ meant something before I adopted this principle of inference that is 
supposedly partly constitutive of its meaning.  
 
And, indeed, it did. This is part of why we say that the principle in question is only partly constitutive 
of its meaning, and that it is so only after the adoption of the principle of inference in question. That 
is, before the induction, I had already adopted the principle 
 that x is a lump of sodium implies that x reacts violently with water 
which was then (as now) partly constitutive of the meaning of ‘sodium’. And this principle, among 
others, was enough to allow me to identify the lump in question as a lump of sodium. But after the 
adoption of the new principle, I contend, the meaning of ‘sodium’ has (literally) changed—even if 
ever so slightly—and, further, one’s perceptual experience of lumps of sodium changes. One now 
literally sees them as the kinds of things that would react violently with fluorine if given the chance, 
whereas one did not see them as that kind of thing before. 
 
One may object that I have not answered the question at hand, but a different question, namely, that 
of how concepts may be said to change. For I have presupposed that I possessed a concept sodium 
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antecedent to my modifying it on inductive grounds. What of the time of first acquisition of the 
concept sodium? 
 
This objection is well-taken. Now is the time to return to that idea appropriated from Steckelmacher 
and Longuenesse, that inductions may be blind and incipient. What exactly does this mean? Suppose 
that I have not yet discovered the element sodium, and that I nonetheless have in my possession 
several lumps of sodium. I recognize these as lumps of physical stuff, but not, obviously, as lumps 
of sodium. I may number these lumps, lump 1 to lump n. And I may conduct experiments on these 
lumps. I may, for example, throw each of these lumps into water, and see that a violent explosion 
occurs whenever I do this. 
 
Now, if lumps 1 to n turn out to have enough in common (in this way), I may decide that they are 
the same kind of thing. Let us call this ‘sodium’.32 Notice that I have made the observations 
 when lump 1 is thrown into water, a violent explosion occurs 
 when lump 2 is thrown into water, a violent explosion occurs 
 … 
 when lump n is thrown into water, a violent explosion occurs 
 
and of course this finite sequence of statements cannot be the ground of any induction, for clearly I 
may not now justifiably adopt the principle made explicit thus: 
 if a lump (of any physical stuff) be thrown in water, then a violent explosion should occur.33 
 
But this is not the only induction that I can take myself to have performed. For after I decide that I 
have reason enough to call all these lumps “lumps of sodium”, I may revisit my previous finite 
sequence  of observation statements and give them an alternative conceptualization retroactively, thus: 
 when lump 1 of sodium is thrown into water, a violent explosion occurs 
 when lump 2 of sodium is thrown into water, a violent explosion occurs 
 … 
 when lump n of sodium is thrown into water, a violent explosion occurs 
 
which does allow me to adopt the principle made explicit as 
                                                
32 My story is reminiscent of Kripke’s image of the baptism of natural kinds, though of course induction did not figure in 
the same way there. 
33 The reason why I should be unjustified in adopting such a principle is that ‘lump (of any physical stuff)’ is not projectible 
in this context. I do not, of course, pretend to offer in the present work a principled distinction between projectible and 
unprojectible predicates.  
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 if a lump of sodium be thrown into water, then a violent explosion should occur. 
 
A blind or incipient induction is thus one that is not on its own a successful induction, because the 
predicate of interest is not projectible, but which admits of a retroactive reconceptualization such 
that a new, projectible predicate is introduced. This is not to say that we always carry on our blind 
inductions so blindly; for what Longuenesse’s Kant has taught us is that any comparison of 
similarities and differences that is capable of yielding a concept is comparison with the goal of such 
conceptual generation. To put it another way, whenever I see a lump’s behaving a certain way with 
respect to water, in order to see its behaving that way at all, I must suppose that it behaves that way 
according to a rule, though I know not what the rule may be. Of course, I must already apply some 
rules in order to see the lump qua physical object. In particular, I must apply the principles of the 
understanding, the regulative interpretation of the categories.  
 
And so one must always have had some concepts to modify and elaborate. And indeed one has. 
These are the categories of the understanding, in their function as rules governing the inductive 
generation of empirical concepts. In the beginning, there were substances, and we stood in 
expectation of causal relations. And then we induced, and became more and more specific: we saw 
that there were different kinds of substances, and different kinds of causal relations. And the more 
we learn, the more specific we get, and the more our concepts change. Thus in science, thus in 
inquiry, thus in life. 
 
I wish to conclude by gesturing at one more broad, Kantian theme that reappears in the quasi-
historical work of Sellars and Rosenberg, and which will serve to fill in and round out the core of my 
project. This has been a project in elaborating my own view of the fundamental nature and structure 
of intentionality, of linguistic content. All the characters in my story have agreed that a system’s having 
content is the same thing as a system’s being about the world.  
 
The world is, of course, a certain kind of thing, and any system that is about it must meet certain 
conditions. Kant’s project is to discover what categories must be applied by a subject for her to have 
experience of the world. We may justifiably transpose Kant’s talk in a linguistic key. For Kant 
himself has gestured at such a transposition: 
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All language is a signification of thought and, on the other hand, the best way of signifying 
thought is through language, the greatest instrument for understanding ourselves and others. 
Thinking is speaking with oneself (the Indians of Tahiti call thinking “speech in the belly”); 
consequently it is also listening to oneself inwardly (by means of the reproductive power of 
imagination). [Anth. 7:193; 300] 
 
One can well regard language as something that arises gradually, for only through it are we in a 
position to make concepts for ourselves. [AP, 25:845; 277] 
 
And, finally: 
Were we to so dissect the transcendental concepts, then this would be a transcendental 
grammar, which contains the ground of human language… [ML2, 28:577; 340] 
 
Transcendental philosophy—whose object is the justification of the application of transcendental 
concepts, the categories— tells us what categories the subject must apply to have experience of the 
world. Correlative with transcendental philosophy is transcendental linguistics, which tells us what a 
language must be like to be about the world. That we may understand Kant’s transcendental project this 
way is suggested explicitly by Sellars in his KTE. 
 
I have here omitted the details of Kant’s transcendental deduction. I have hinted that its structure is 
something like this: having experience of the world requires the original synthetic unity of 
apperception; and the latter requires application of the categories, correlative with the forms of 
judgment. Strawson in BS reduces the number of forms of judgment to two, claiming that Kant’s 
Table of Judgment is redundant.34 The two in question are subject and predicate. If we then say that 
experience of the world requires application of subjects and predicates, Strawson says, this is 
uninformative. For of course any discursive representation of the world requires subjects and 
predicates. These are the necessary building blocks of sentences, the minimal unit that may 
correspond to a fact, to a way the world is. It is thus a truism that we need subjects and predicates to 
say how the world is.  
 
But if my account of the role of predicates is correct, then even if we do reduce Kant’s table in the 
way that Strawson suggests, we have arrived at an important idea. For if predicates have their 
                                                
34 Longuenesse claims that Strawson is in error, that the table of judgments was not intended as an enumeration of the 
essential logical connectives or syntactic categories, but that it was meant to correspond to the concepts of comparison 
that are essential to the generation of empirical concepts. I have in this draft omitted detailed consideration of her 
account of this correspondence; for now it suffices to say that one may agree with her against Strawson and yet hold that 
subject and predicate fall out of the Table of Judgments and are essential to linguistic representation (and, correlatively, 
experience of the world).   
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content constituted by principles of material inference that are inductively justified, then experience 
of the world requires that we be able to adopt such principles and that we be able to induce. And 
here is a straightforward expression of a transcendental deduction of inductive reasoning. This I 
have been suggesting, of course, all along—or at least ever since section II, when I argued that a 
language that was meaningful in the way ours was must have projectible predicates.  
 
The unity of apperception is possible, Kant argues in detail in the Principles, only given the 
categories of substance and cause. We may associate these with the grammatical categories of subject and 
predicate. When we ask what is required to represent the world, in experience or in language, we are 
asking what is required to represent something that is spatiotemporally and causally articulated. (And 
these two aspects of its articulation are inseparable, if Kant’s conclusions in the Principles are 
correct.) What does it take, broadly, to represent a spatiotemporally and causally articulated system?  
 
We might merely recapitulate the system. We might recapitulate type-causal relations with inferential 
relations. (This is suggested by Brandom in RIP). The idea here is that inferential relations in the 
inferentially-articulated network of language bear a relationship to the network as a whole that is 
isomorphic to the relationship that causal relations in the causally-articulated network of the world 
bear to their network. This is recapitulation as isomorphic resemblance. This is what, it seems to me, 
linguistic representation amounts to, on both Rosenberg’s and Brandom’s views. Representation is a 
causal shaping of language by the world, until the former resembles the latter.  
 
But this is not enough for me. It cannot be that language merely resembles the world: it must stand 
in a certain intentional connection with the world. Of course, it cannot be that inferential relations 
stand in a direct intentional relationship with causal relations in the world. For direct intentional 
relations are like those in which singular conceptual experiencings stand to objects. We intuit 
objects, and we intuit them as instantiating certain properties (in, perhaps, the way I have elaborated 
in this section). But we never see a type causal relation. We never see that rocks should fall, be they 
dropped. We see only falling rocks. 
 
How, then, can inferential relations stand in an intentional relationship with type causal relations, if 
not directly? My answer is that they do so indirectly. They do so in virtue of the direct intentional 
relations in which we stand to the objects of our intuitions—to the semantic values of our singular 
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conceptual representings. And the indirect intentional route is, at this stage, easy to map out. It is an 
inductive route. Inferential relations are constituted by principles of material inference whose 
adoption is justified by an induction from observations, where the latter are our means of standing 
in direct intentional relations with the world.   
 
So the relationship between subjects—think again of singular terms—and predicates is one of 
mutual support. On the one hand, reference is required for the inductive instances that are necessary 
to give content to empirical predicates. On the other hand, we see never merely a this but always a 
this-such: one must always have some predicates already, if one is to have perceptual-conceptual 
representings at all. This is one way to express an idea of McDowell’s, and originally from Sellars: 
just as there is a respect in which observations serve as a foundation for a linguistic system, there is 
an aspect in which the linguistic system stands as a foundation for them.  
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3. Application. 
VI. Intending the Possible: Meaning and Modal Epistemology 
I aimed in the last section to fill in essential features of my favored picture of intentionality by 
dressing it in (reappropriated and recycled) Kantian clothes. I had said already that the meaning of 
an empirical predicate is embodied in principles of material inference, which may be made explicit 
by a subjunctive rendering. The adoption of these principles must be inductively justified; that is, 
their adoption must be the analytic implication of having adopted the end of explaining the instances 
of the induction in question.35 These instances are observations, where the notion of observation is 
that of the disjunctive conception of experience. That is, an observation contains an essentially 
singular demonstrative content, but only if this content stands in a relation of reference to a suitable 
object in the observer’s environment. When this happens, the observer is in direct epistemic 
commerce with that very object, in the sense that, if the object were not there, the content of the 
observer’s perceptual-conceptual representing would be different. That is, when we ask, “how are 
things with the observer?”, the answer is different depending on whether reference is successful—that 
is, depending on whether the observer sees the suitable object. 
 
Filling in my favored picture of intentionality involved unifying it. That is, it involved answering the 
question how inference is related to the kind of conscious sensory experience of objects that is 
correlative with reference to those objects. The answer was that the very shape of conscious sensory 
experience, the shape of spatiotemporal sensuality, is inferentially discursive. For example, our 
experience as-of objective temporal relations of succession and simultaneity is, constitutively, 
experience as-of substances that persist amidst change that occurs according to rules. Such rules are 
precisely those of which we assay the recapitulation (though, as we also saw in the last section, not 
the mere recapitulation) in language, in the form of principles of material inference. 
 
There are many questions that remain.  
 
For example, what do I take inference to be? Is inference ultimately to be construed in terms of 
social practices of deontic scorekeeping, à la Brandom, or in terms of individual abilities?  How do I 
                                                
35 This end is related to the end of experiencing a world. I suspect, in fact, that it is an analytic implication of having the 
end of experiencing a world that one endeavor to explain inductive instances—and any observation, as we saw in the last 
section, is at least a potential inductive instance.  
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propose to explicate the normative character of intentionality? With the I-thou, as Brandom does, or 
with the I-we? 
 
Do I believe that causation is something that happens in the world? All I have done is to assent to 
Kant’s answer to his quid juris, the question of right. I have said that we are justified in inducing, and 
(as I have said, correlatively) in applying the categories of substance and cause; and have suggested 
that we are thus justified because doing these things is an analytic implication of having adopted the 
end of experiencing a world. But the question remains whether I am suggesting something only 
about us, or about the world as well. Kant’s answer is, of course, to say that he is suggesting 
something about us; none of these conclusions is apposite where the world an sich is concerned. He 
ontologizes, so to speak, his answer to the quid juris by introducing a world of mere appearance. He 
may then say that it is true of that world that changes occur according to causal rules; but this is 
really only to say that we must experience things that way, and so the ontologization may be 
construed as merely metaphorical. Perhaps we simply ought not to ontologize the question; perhaps 
there is no sense to it, beyond its being a quid juris.  
 
And what exactly is my position on truth and its role in meaning? I am clearly opposed to 
Brandom’s view that truth is to be defined in terms of warranted assertion, for we cannot adopt this 
view, I said in section IV, lest we lose our grip on the idea of objectivity. But I have not talked very 
much about truth’s role in meaning, except when I said that an observation must be true if it is to 
have the essential singular demonstrative content that makes it the observation that it is. Given that 
I have insisted on the disjunctive conception of experience, truth in this connection is indeed 
(according to me) robustly intentional. But it is important to remember that truth here is not 
something attributable to one’s representing over and above, and separate from, the standing one 
occupies in the space of reasons. That is, one cannot say of such a demonstrative representing that 
my having it is rationally warranted, and then that, incidentally, it is veridical. My claim is that, with 
respect to conceptual representings (for example, perceptual ones) with singular demonstrative 
content, one may believe such contents justifiably only if they are true. Otherwise, there is nothing to 
believe: for that this is a cat before me cannot be false and yet remain a representing with singular 
demonstrative content. (The non-veridical conceptual experiencing may be as-with singular 
demonstrative content, but it does not have singular demonstrative content.)  
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There are other interesting questions in the neighborhood. For example, suppose that I adopt a 
correspondence theory of truth. Any sentence is true, I say, that corresponds to some fact. Now, 
suppose I adopt the principle made explicit 
 if sodium be thrown into water, then a violent explosion should occur. 
The question is whether this subjunctive conditional has truth-conditions. Suppose it does. Then it 
is true just in case there is some fact to which it corresponds. But this fact cannot be the fact of 
every lump of sodium’s having induced an explosion upon being thrown into water; nor can it be 
the fact that every such lump will forever induce such an explosion. Perhaps the modal character of 
the statement can be diffused when we derive the (subjunctively characterized) dispositions of sodium 
from sodium’s categorical properties. But perhaps this would be unnatural in light of my project; for if 
the concept of sodium is constitutively regulated by various principles of inference, and if these 
recapitulate causal principles, there is then the suggestion that what makes sodium sodium is that it 
is governed by these causal principles; and so one cannot say that its dispositions arise from its 
categorical essence, because it is rather its dispositions that, considered together, make it what it 
essentially is. And so our inferential principle’s corresponding to a subjunctive causal principle might 
be the correspondence required for the inferential principle’s truth. But are such subjunctives spun 
into the fabric of reality? Some say yes. Marc Lange, for example, has argued that such subjunctives 
lie at the bottom of the world [LL]. 
 
Of course, there was a move I made above that might not be a necessary one, though I maintain 
that it was a natural one to have made. It was, in effect, the move from saying that predicates are 
constituted by their role in the inferentially-articulated architectonic of our language to saying that 
properties are constituted by their role in the causally-articulated architectonic of our world. (Saying 
this would, incidentally, also answer that previous question we considered, of whether I thought 
causation was something that happened, as it were, in the world itself.)  
 
I might, on the other hand, suggest indicative truth conditions for subjunctives—or at least the 
pretense of such indicative conditions. For example, I might write the truth conditions for 
subjunctives in the indicative mood of a model theory with possible worlds. Doing so is not 
incompatible with the qualified inferentialist picture of intentionality that I favor. Using model 
theory with possible worlds as a tool to show up semantic compositionality is a different, though 
related, project. Indeed, no one would extensionalize intensionality in this way unless she saw that 
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doing so captured relations of entailment: for example, in all the worlds in which there is a bag of 
potatoes in my pantry, there is a bag of potatoes in my house; this serves to capture the materially 
valid inference from there is a bag of potatoes in my pantry to there is a bag of potatoes in my house. Moreover, 
theories of discourse structure in linguistics are rife with inferentialist overtones; consider, for 
example, Irene Heim’s file change semantics, in which the meaning of an expression is taken, at 
bottom, so to say, to be its context change potential, from which its truth conditions can be derived.36  
 
Of course, quasi-indicative truth conditions in terms of possible worlds are unsatisfactory as an 
answer to the question whether the causal subjunctive is really woven into the fabric of reality. But 
no matter; I shall leave this, and other tantalizing, questions aside. Instead, I wish to turn my 
attention to the question of our knowledge of possibility. Since knowledge requires justification, to 
know that-possibly-p one must be justified in believing that-possibly-p. The guiding question of this 
section is this: what does entertaining such a content require? That is: the content of our empirical 
predicates is content they accrue inductively, in the course of our epistemic commerce with the 
world as it is. The question is what bearing this has on the question of when we are justified in 
claiming that the world might have been a certain way.  
 
A brief genealogy is in order, for my decision to neglect the other interesting questions I have 
mentioned in favor of the question of our knowledge of possibility may seem a dialectically 
unmotivated one. When I first declared my intention to write a thesis for Honors in Philosophy, I 
said that I should write it on the epistemology of modality. I had developed the strong prejudice that 
many putative descriptions of possible worlds were really conceptually ill-formed collections of sign 
designs with nothing deserving to be called content. And I thought that this was because the 
meanings of the words participating in such constellations were, in a deep sense, tied to the actual 
world in which their use has arisen, such that they are simply inapplicable, contrary to their use here, 
in the remotest corners of the modal multiverse. The picture I have suggested in this project is one 
in which words are thus tied to the world in consort with which we develop them. More precisely, 
this consort is inductive. I have, it might have been noticed, also built in to the meanings of these 
words a certain modal force: for their meanings are embodied in principles of material inference, 
which may be made explicit by a subjunctive rendering. Of course, I did not do this merely because I 
                                                
36 Bernhard Nickel has argued, in his DBS, that we may fruitfully see Brandom’s inferentialism as a kind of dynamic 
semantics. 
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planned this section on the epistemology of modality. By the time I reached the details of the 
project, I had quite forgotten the original issue. Happily, I happen to have the resources to tackle it 
now. I submit the following principle. 
 
Negative Principle of the Epistemology of Modality. One is unentitled to any 
proposition inconsistent with (the subjunctive rendering of) an inductively supported 
principle of material inference.  
 
Proof. Suppose there is an inductively supported principle of material inference, given an 
explicit rendering thus: 
 if x be F, then x should be G. 
Suppose one claims 
 it is possible that there be an F that is yet not G 
It is partially constitutive of the very meaning of ‘F’ and ‘G’ that the principle in question 
holds. So to make the claim in question is to use ‘F’ and ‘G’ contrary to what they mean. 
This, it is obvious, one is unentitled to do. 
 
So, in particular, one may not say 
 there is a possible world in which sodium does not react violently with water, 
or 
there is a possible world in which there are human beings biologically and behaviorally 
identical with us who yet participate in no mental life.37 
 
Now, this may seem a hyperconservative conclusion. For surely, it might be said, if only the laws of 
nature had been different from how they actually are, sodium might not have reacted violently with 
water. And surely it is possible that the laws of nature have been different than they are.  
 
I do not wish to entertain the question of just how necessary the laws of nature are. But I do wish to 
show that it is fully compatible with my view that the laws of nature be logically contingent. Let us 
consider Kant’s First Postulate of Empirical Thinking in General: 
Whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in accordance with intuition and 
concepts) is possible. [A218/B266] 
 
                                                
37 I do not think that induction pulls all the weight with respect to this example. I doubt that ‘human being’ is a purely 
empirical predicate (unlike, say, ‘water’ or ‘sodium’); and I suspect that much of what is often characterized as “mental 
life” is more properly expressed in normative terms. I have already suggested—in section V—that the normative is 
related in important respects to the domain of analytic principles. To these induction is irrelevant. But such questions are 
beyond the scope of this project. 
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I happily endorse this postulate. Let us consider Newton’s law of gravitation, which, on Kant’s view, 
is not necessary, in the sense that some other law might have held instead. This is because there is 
nothing in the Principles of the Understanding that requires Newton’s law of gravitation to hold. 
What is required by the Principles is that the world be one of substances that stand in causal 
relations to one another. (There are other requirements, of course. Kant claims, for example, to have 
derived a principle of conservation of matter a priori. But I ignore such complications.) Such a 
causally-articulated world can be realized in different ways.  
 
We might think of the Principles as defining the space of possibility for worlds of physical objects. 
Physical objects must, qua physical objects, stand in causal relations to one another. That is (part of) 
what makes something physical. But within such constraints, the possibilities for how they stand in 
relation to one another, qua physical objects, are various. One such possibility is that Newton’s law 
of gravitation holds. When we say that the laws of nature might have been different, we are saying 
that the laws governing physical objects qua physical objects might have been different; for all a 
thing has to be, to be a physical object, is to conform to the Principles of the Understanding. 
 
But to be a lump of sodium, one must do more than conform to the Principles of the 
Understanding. (It is necessary to conform to them, of course, for to be a lump of sodium one must 
be a physical object.) One must also conform to those laws governing lumps of sodium qua lumps 
of sodium. Or: to use the expression ‘lump of sodium’ in an acceptable way, one must conform to 
the principles of inference in which is embodied the meaning of the expression. 
 
In general, the limits of the applicability of empirical predicates are their meanings, as embodied in 
inductively justified principles of material inference. We might, as I have elsewhere suggested, think 
of such inferential principles as recapitulating certain causal principles. If these causal principles 
govern physical objects qua physical objects, then they are not logically necessary, since it is the sole 
authority of the Principles of the Understanding to define the space of possibility for physical 
objects. But for lumps of sodium qua lumps of sodium, the Principles play a different role. They are 
the means by which the concept lump of sodium is inductively generated; but they do not determine 
the content of the concept. That responsibility is borne by the world.  
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Our language is thus incapable of describing worlds very different from our own. This does not 
mean that it is incapable of describing any other genuinely possible worlds—that is, ways our world 
might indeed have been. For example, I may say 
 if I had thrown this rock off the cliff, it would have hit the ledge. 
We may capture this by saying 
 there is a possible world in which I threw this rock off the cliff and it hit the ledge 
whose assessment makes essential appeal to a principle of material inference, explicitly rendered 
if a rock be thrown straight down from the top of a cliff and there be a ledge appropriately 
placed, &c., then the rock should hit the ledge. 
 
We see that such principles of inference are not to be violated in exploring alternative possibilities. 
Indeed, their application in such exploration is our only route to discovering what these possibilities 
are, to discovering how things might have been different from the way they were. 38 By “things”, 
here, I intend the events of our lives, of our universe’s history, and so on. I do not intend things like 
our having minds.  
 
Now, it might be said, even if our language cannot be used to describe remote possibility—actually, 
I doubt that such remote “possible worlds” are genuine possibilities in any interesting sense, but this 
doubt goes beyond the epistemic-cum-semantic issue in question here— surely we could invent a 
language that could be. The suggestion is that we could build such a language from the ground up, as 
it were, by taking some scheme of laws compatible with the Principles of the Understanding, and 
then saying 
imagine that there were some substance that behaved in such-and-such a way, in conformity 
with this scheme of laws; now call that substance “S” 
 
or something similar. I should insist that any such program would be misguided. For in any such 
program there would be no induction. That is, there would be no actual, historical, temporally located 
instances—occurrences of singular demonstrative observation—that could serve to confer content on 
the incipient otherworldly semantic web. This is to say that no predicate in this “language” (‘S’) 
would be empirical, because an empirical predicate is one whose content is embodied in a principle of 
inference that we are justified in adopting on the basis of an induction from observations, which are 
                                                
38 Notice that applying such principles of inference to discover the alternative possibilities involves no “imagination” 
(except in the Kantian sense), “conceiving”, or “intuitions of possibility”.  
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actual, historical, temporally located occurrences of singular demonstrative observation. And so I am 
not sure in what sense the system that such a project would develop would count as a system for 
describing a world.39  
 
I have been concerned here to explore some of the aspects of our intentional-cum-epistemic 
engagement with the world. That is, I have been concerned with that one world, and our knowledge 
of it, as captured in the title of Rosenberg’s second book [OWOKOI]. The exploration might have 
gone in a number of different directions—for such is, as I know, the nature of such exercises. (I 
shan’t make explicit the principles of material inference governing ‘undergraduate Honors thesis’. 
Doubtless I couldn’t even if I tried.) The details are not so important, I think, as the theme, upon 
which I insist even if I am willing to sacrifice large chunks of the variation. Language is, among 
other things, the representation of our world. But insofar as language represents worlds, it represents 
only one. Happily, there is only one world to represent—along with the ways it might have been, but 
wasn’t. Nor is it parochial to insist that one should know one’s way around one’s home—the 
world—and nothing else. For when one’s home is everything that is the case, why should one ever 
want to leave?  
 
  
                                                
39 It would in any case be absurd to say that we had “discovered” something about the nature of reality (supposedly the 
subject matter of metaphysics) when we said “S is a possible substance!” For what newspaper would herald such a 
“discovery”? The lesson here is that discoveries are empirical. There is nothing about the possible to discover. We may 
reflect on the “nature” of modality, and we may say that we are entitled to insist on the possibility of this rock’s having 
hit the ledge, had I dropped it; but there is no “discovery” to make of the extra subjunctivity, once we have developed 
apt concepts of rock, ledge, fall, and so on. 
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